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STATESMAN OR SCRIBE?
LEGAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF

DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
Aziz Rana*
INTRODUCTION

Lawyers today find themselves on the defensive, viewed by more and
more Americans as "simply a plague on society."' Public opinion polls
routinely give attorneys low marks for honesty and ethical standards,
ranking them behind virtually every occupational group except for
insurance salesmen, advertising practitioners, and car salesmen. 2 Recent
American Bar Association (ABA) surveys further confirm popular mistrust;
they report that the profession's public image falls at or near the bottom of
all American institutions, ahead only of the media. 3 This mistrust captures
an increasing sentiment among ordinary citizens that lawyers constitute a
hidden and unelected elite and a threat to democratic ideals.4 While all
citizens are supposed to have an equal voice in controlling public policy,
lawyers seemingly embody a separate caste, able to manipulate elected
representatives and assert undue pressure on political life. The conservative
* Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow in Law, Yale Law School. I would like to thank Bruce
Ackerman, Robert Gordon, Alex Gourevitch, Darryl Li, Odette Lienau, Thomas Merrill,
Russell Pearce, and Jedediah Purdy for their generous comments on earlier drafts of this
essay. I would also like to thank Bruce Green and Fordham Law School for organizing the
Colloquium on the Lawyer's Role in a Contemporary Democracy as well as all the
participants for their invaluable reflections and feedback. Kathleen Lange and the editorial
team at the Fordham Law Review provided excellent technical and substantive help
throughout the publication process.
1.Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1240
(1991).
2. See John Tierney, The Big City; Bar Sinister: Lawyers Earn Public's Wrath, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 1999, at B1.
3. See LEO J. SHAPIRO & Assocs., AM. BAR Ass'N, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS
CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 6 (2002) [hereinafter ABA, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS] (reporting
that only 19% of Americans say they are "extremely" or "very" confident in lawyers, as
compared to 50% for doctors); see also M/A/R/C RESEARCH, AM. BAR ASS'N, PERCEPTIONS
OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (1999) (similarly finding that only 14% of respondents
asserted strong confidence in the legal profession).
4. According to one American Bar Association (ABA) study, the decline of
professional reputation is directly tied to discomfort "with the connections that lawyers have
with politics, the judiciary, government, big business, and law enforcement." ABA, PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS, supra note 3, at 4. Americans fear that these connections allow lawyers "not
only to play the system, but also to shape that very system." Id.
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call for tort reform, with its presentation of trial lawyers as wealthy elites
preying upon middle-class doctors and businessmen, draws much of its
appeal from these arguments. According to Walter Olson, an outspoken
critic of the trial bar,
The new rule of lawyers brings us many evils, but perhaps the greatest
is the way it robs the American people of the right to find its own future
and pursue its own destiny. No doubt democratic processes often fall
short of perfection ....But however uncertain the results of democracy,

however slow and clumsy its procedures, we can feel quite sure that it is a
better course than agreeing to turn over
our rights of self-government to a
5
new class of unaccountable lawyers.
Moreover, this skepticism is not the exclusive domain of the American
Right but extends across the political spectrum. In recent years, scholars
and commentators on the left have found themselves in a heated debate
about the appropriateness of pursuing transformative projects through the
courts rather than in more popular settings. Disturbed by the political
retreat of social movements representing labor interests, racial equality, and
women's rights, these left commentators have blamed the turn to the
judiciary (and the dominance of lawyers within these movements) as partly
responsible for the collapse of mass backing and participation. The late
social historian Christopher Lasch maintained that,
The great liberal victories-desegregation, affirmative action, legislative
reapportionment, legalized abortion-were won largely in the courts, not
in Congress, in the state legislatures, or at the polls. Instead of seeking to
create popular consensus behind these reforms, liberals pursued their
objective by indirect
methods, fearing that popular attitudes remained
6
unreconstructed.
In his view, because lawyers-rather than the public at large--drove the
enactment of such policies, they have been on shaky democratic footing
ever since. 7 Within legal academia, Gerald Rosenberg is perhaps best
known for articulating these claims. 8 He sees lawyer-driven reform as
inevitably facing a democratic deficit, in which an elite bar imposes its ends
on the public without ever gathering a meaningful mandate: "When courts
decide things, for better or worse, I think that many Americans feel they are

5. WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS:

HOW THE NEW LITIGATION ELITE

THREATENS AMERICA'S RULE OF LAW 313-14 (2003).
6. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS 37

(1991).
7. Id.
8. Gerald Rosenberg's book, The Hollow Hope, presents a left critique of Brown v.
Board of Education and the capacity of court action to alter social life dramatically. GERALD
N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed.

2008) (arguing that the ruling had no meaningful effect on precipitating the end of
segregation in the South).
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unaccountable. They feel helpless. They feel there's little they can do.
And that creates a sense of outrage." 9
Confronted with the charge of being antidemocratic by both the Right
and the Left, the modem legal profession appears gripped by a generalized
version of the "countermajoritarian difficulty."' 0 Over forty years ago,
Alexander Bickel argued that when the U.S. Supreme Court declares
legislative acts to be unconstitutional, "it thwarts the will of representatives
of the actual people ... it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing
majority, but against it."'I Similarly, today's claim that the profession as a
whole faces a democratic deficit implies that whenever lawyers employ the
courts to pursue their own political objectives, they usurp the authority of
elected leaders and challenge the self-government of citizens. These views
have clearly struck a sensitive nerve within the profession. In an effort to
improve its public image, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(ATLA) recently changed its name to the far vaguer American Association
of Justice (AAJ). 12 In fact, the suspicion that including the word "lawyer"
in the title of an advocacy group may undermine its popular support has
affected more than just the trial bar.
Even a public interest
nongovernmental organization (NGO) like the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights concluded that a name change, in this case to Human Rights
First, may be the best way to communicate with a public that is skeptical of
the profession. 13
In legal ethics, the problem of the bar's democratic illegitimacy manifests
itself in a persistent disagreement about which principles should govern the
activity of lawyering. In particular, it shapes a key debate about how to
address the tension between an attorney's duties to her clients and to the
public interest writ large. On one side are those who maintain that lawyers
should balance client loyalty with a moral commitment to justice and a
pursuit of valuable social ends. 14 They emphasize that, according to the
ABA Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers are not only client
representatives but are also public citizens and officers of the legal

9. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong
Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 819 (2006).
10. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-28 (1962).
11. Id. at 17.
12. Ann Knef, ATLA Drops 'Trial Lawyer, 'Adds 'Justice' to Name, W. VA. REC., July

19, 2006. This move led Lisa Rickert, president of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform, to crow that the name change represented "'an astounding admission of the
unpopularity of trial lawyers in America."' Id. (quoting Lisa A. Rickert, President, U.S.

Chamber Institute for Legal Reform).
13. See Human Rights First, Human Rights First Is the New Name of the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights (Jan. 30, 2004), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about
-us/name change/name-change.htm.
14. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); Robert

W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); William H. Simon,
EthicalDiscretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
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system. 15 On the other side are those who defend an ideal of "'zealous
advocacy within the bounds of the law,""q 6 and contend that attorneys
should be strongly partisan and motivated by a primary focus on client
autonomy.1 7 These critics of legal independence, found on both the left and
the right, cast the promotion of the bar's moral autonomy in a harsh light.
They argue that ethical independence from clients and an orientation toward
the lawyer's distinct vision of justice or the public interest is tantamount to
client domination. 18
Such domination allegedly reproduces in the
representational context precisely the fears of elite control and
unaccountability that mark the bar's larger democratic predicament in
public life.
If anything, the presumption of a democracy deficit has placed supporters
of a morally reflective practice in the unenviable position of offering an
apology for professional power. Since legal practice's underlying lack of
popular legitimacy is largely taken for granted, scholars are inevitably
trapped into presenting either an explicit or an implicit defense of elite
politics. The most common version of this defense reconceives the lawyer
ideal as one of "statesmanship" rather than zealous advocacy. 19 It laments
the bar's decline from a class of "social trustee[s]" 20 who were once
"guardian[s] of our material interests and political culture" 2 1 to little more
than technical experts and autonomy agents-"a species of office
management whose main virtue is efficiency rather than wisdom. ' 22 Some
supporters appear to do away almost entirely with the pretense of
reconciling legal independence with democratic equality. Geoffrey Hazard,
in his seminal piece, The Future of Legal Ethics, at one point waxes poetic
about the benefits of aristocracy and elite rule, remarking that, "As a
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2001).
16. For a description of this view, see W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104
COLUM. L. REV 363, 364 (2004). See also Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting
ProfessionalIdentity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 52 (2003).
17. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 57 (1990) ("[T]he
attorney acts unprofessionally and immorally by depriving clients of their autonomy.., by
otherwise preempting their moral decisions, or by depriving them of the ability to carry out
their lawful decisions."); see also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1073 (1976); Stephen L.
Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 614.
18. But see William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of ProgressiveLawyering: A Comment
on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1099, 1101 (1994). In the article, Simon describes and ultimately rejects the call for client
empowerment among poverty lawyers. Id. According to him, this call is tied to concerns
that the bar unduly dominates its poor clients, substituting professional interests for those of
marginalized communities. Id.
19. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
20. STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS IN
POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE 9 (1994).
21. Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 209, 277 (2003).
22. KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 4.
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constitutional matter, Tocqueville could be right that the 'aristocratic'
element-composed of a legal profession or other groups-serves the long'23
run good of society if it is suitably organized and restrained.
Ultimately, the prevailing debate leaves lawyers with a stark choice: they
must decide between becoming statesmen or scribes, either standing above
most Americans or rigidly enacting a client's will, more or less irrespective
of its ethical content. In conflating the activity of legal citizenship with an
elevated status as a lawyer-guardian, proponents of professional
independence often ignore the basic democratic premise that caring for the
public must be a cooperative endeavor-one in which all individuals share
jointly in the responsibilities of decision making. At the other extreme,
client-centered accounts reduce the lawyer to simply a scribe or
functionary, particularly when the client is a large corporate entity. They
reach the problematic conclusion that respecting democracy requires
adherence to neutral partisanship regardless of whether one's actions
actually undermine the foundations of popular self-rule. As a consequence,
neither approach provides a truly democratic ethos for lawyers, one that
informs both their legal practice and their broader public commitments as
citizens equally charged with maintaining common institutions.
While scholarship in legal ethics by and large presupposes a claim about
the lawyer's democratic deficit, I argue that professional independence is
not in tension with, but in fact is crucial to core principles of self-rule. In a
sense, both sides of the current debate operate within a limited account of
democratic imagination, which in practice forces lawyers to choose between
adhering to democratic principles and exercising their independent
judgment.
Client-centered perspectives often reduce self-government
simply to electoral mechanisms and formal procedures. And rather than
expanding the substantive meaning of democracy beyond these formal
characteristics, proponents of moral independence tend to present robust
citizenship as the domain of elites.
Without a richer political theory of self-government, the debate in legal
ethics remains subject to a seemingly irreconcilable binary. As such, this
essay does not offer a new interpretation of the rules, but instead suggests a
stronger and more coherent theoretical grounding for those who wish to
defend the lawyer as an autonomous moral agent. I argue that embedded in
the very nature of legal practice is an irreducible degree of discretion, in
which lawyers face unavoidable conflicts about how to situate their clients'
objectives within a host of competing social ends. Moreover, lawyers
cannot evade these choices by imagining themselves as mere instruments
for the expression of an already formed and coherent client will. Central to
the very nature of legal work is a basic question: How should the attorney

23. Hazard, supra note 1, at 1277 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (J. P. Mayer & M. Lerner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966)
(1835)).

1670

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

relate to her own discretionary activity and what principles should guide her
exercise of judgment?
This essay offers a preliminary answer by locating discussions of legal
ethics within a broader American democratic tradition, one which is too
often subsumed in today's public discourse. 24 According to this alternative
tradition, democracy embodies a collective exercise in continuous and
extensive self-rule in all social institutions. Such ideals do not detach
political life from economic life, and imagine work as both a permanent
education in citizenship and a central site for the everyday practice of moral
reflection. Instead of conceiving of the legal profession as an aristocratic
caste distinct from most Americans, thinkers in this tradition-including
William Manning, Abraham Lincoln, and John Dewey-rejected any
separation between learning and labor, and presented legal practice as one
among many forms of ethical and autonomous work. Viewed through this
political lens, the professional crisis of democratic legitimacy is not the
product of legal independence per se. Rather, it is the result of long-term
social trends that have undermined the institutional supports for a more
expansive democratic culture and thus disconnected legal practice,
particularly among the elite bar, from popular forms of work and political
participation. This essay attempts to situate the modern profession within a
larger democratic ethos, while acknowledging the degree to which ethical
autonomy has diminished across economic and political settings. Drawing
from an earlier tradition, it sketches out implications for the bar's role in
society and highlights moral standards that might guide the contemporary
lawyer's own discretionary activity. In developing this argument, it
underscores a fact about legal discretion that none of the prevailing ethical
approaches fully appreciates. Any attempt to articulate the legitimacy of
professional independence is necessarily incomplete without a meaningful
account of the political community within which lawyers exercise their
judgment.
In addition, I aim to address practicing attorneys in two ways. First, I
hope to strengthen the willingness of lawyers to engage in ethical reflection
by offering a more compelling normative defense of morally aware legal
representation-one that is grounded in a democratic political theory and
that directly confronts countermajoritarian charges. Unlike notions of legal
statesmanship, the defense I offer here employs an American political
tradition that underscores the centrality of professional autonomy to robust
citizenship. According to this vision, when corporate attorneys engage their
clients in practices of ethical counseling or refuse to create elaborate tax
schemes that contradict the spirit of the law, they actually fulfill a basic
democratic function. Consistent with the hopes of Manning, Lincoln, and
Dewey, these actions see work as a space in which individuals cultivate
24. For more on the emergence and continued relevance of early American ideals of
democratic practice and citizenship, especially their connections to the experience of
colonial settlement and imperial expansion, see generally AzIZ RANA, SETrLER EMPIRE AND
THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (forthcoming 2010).
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habits of responsibility and continually reflect on the moral and political
implications of their own activities. Regardless of practice setting, lawyers
have an obligation to balance client interests with ethical considerations.
Second, I maintain that lawyers should employ their professional
discretion to expand the capacities of Americans to exercise economic and
political autonomy.
In many routine forms of legal practice, the
opportunity to promote popular discretion and authority may not exist. But
precisely because lawyers operate at the intersection of law, politics, and
bureaucracy-whether they work in public interest litigation, administrative
and regulatory practices, class action contexts, or matters of criminal lawquestions of citizen engagement and control are more prevalent than one
might initially suppose. To the extent that opportunities do arise, lawyers
can help develop institutional solutions that deepen popular participation
and draw on the knowledge and involvement of local communities. Such a
representational approach will not provide a panacea for overcoming the
bar's larger crisis of legitimacy or for ensuring that all acts of discretion
fulfill democratic obligations. 25 Still, if attorneys infuse their practice with
substantive ethical commitments, these practitioners can embody both an
example of democratic lawyering and a method for reforming the bar's
relationship to the wider community of citizens.
In Part II, I explore in greater detail the limits of the current debate in
legal ethics about moral autonomy. In particular, I argue that most accounts
of independence-even those that defend the ideal of a "people's lawyer"fall back on a version of republican elitism that inevitably distinguishes the
activity of ruling from the practices of everyday participation. Part III then
turns to the vision of democratic culture defended by Lincoln and others in
which work provided an ethical training for citizenship as well as a crucial
arena for its exercise. This discussion compares today's claims regarding
client domination with classic Jeffersonian and Jacksonian arguments about
the bar's elitism. Such nineteenth-century Democrats believed that legal
privilege, entrenched by specialized education and powerful bar
associations, transformed lawyers into mere dependents of wealthy
benefactors unable to distinguish between gentry interests and the public
good, Unlike today's critics of professional power, these previous thinkers
condemned lawyers for failing to demonstrate enough independent moral
judgment-which they saw as integral to popular self-rule.
I return in Part IV to the question of why the profession faces a crisis of
democratic legitimacy. I argue that the prevailing suspicion of lawyers
cannot be solved through changes in legal ethics rules alone. It is the
product of discontent with a broader political development: the division in
American life between neutralized citizens and empowered experts. This
shift is, in large part, the consequence of the increasing hierarchy and
25. These problems are deeply entrenched; they are the product of massive sociological
changes and are in many ways inherent in the nature of modem professional work (whether
undertaken by doctors, engineers, or lawyers).
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complexity that mark modem political and economic administration.
Lawyers have borne the brunt of public opposition to these developments
due to the profession's unique role at the intersection of law and politics.
As I discuss extensively-through a rereading of Walter Lippmann and an
assessment of recent legal ethics scholarship-such changes clearly threaten
the vision of a local, highly participatory community espoused throughout
the nineteenth century. However, Part IV also underscores what remains
plausible about this more democratic mode of lawyering. In the context of
energetic and engaged social movements, it emphasizes the importance for
the legal profession of employing its own discretion to expand the capacity
of the public to act informally and spontaneously to challenge entrenched
hierarchies. I present this argument by exploring how lawyers have
defended the right to strike--one such example of discretionary popular
power-and by outlining how the democratic ethos for which I argue might
in practice influence an attorney's representational approach.
The goal of this discussion is to highlight the extent to which an
alternative theory of politics and law sheds light on the potential challenges
facing modem lawyers concerned with the status of democracy. By way of
a conclusion, I describe the democratic function that lawyers can play when
social movements are in retreat-a circumstance far more akin to our
current moment. With the participatory institutions that undergirded labor
and civil rights activism steadily eroding, lawyers can no longer simply
protect the spaces for informal protest and uphold constraints on
bureaucratic power. Given the bar's position in legal and political life,
attorneys have a professional responsibility to participate in rebuilding the
institutional frameworks within which citizens can assert their voice and
intervene in collective decision making. At the macrolevel, this means
orienting courts toward citizens by simplifying key elements of the legal
system, in the process more broadly dispersing ethical autonomy and
political agency. In fact, lawyers should view such efforts as part of a wider
effort to link administrative and regulatory policy to participatory modes of
governance. Such governance would ideally combine the benefits of
centralized accountability with the extensive devolution of actual control to
those local constituencies directly affected by economic, social, and
environmental concerns.
At the microlevel of daily practice, I suggest how the activities of popular
organizing embody a means by which lawyers can integrate a democratic
ethos within particular representational contexts. Class action litigation
pertaining to school desegregation provides a useful lens for appreciating
how this approach not only serves democratic ends but better fulfills
professional duties of client representation.
As a final note, these
discussions of lawyers and organizing are not meant to exhaust the realm of
democratic lawyering, but are offered as initial illustrations of how such
practices might operate in one particular legal setting. In the end, to escape
the statesman-scribe binary, any attempt to defend the attorney's moral
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independence must emphasize how everyday choices made by lawyers can
create the environment for effective collective action and control.
I. DIFFERENTIATED CITIZENSHIP AND THE CALL FOR INDEPENDENCE

The debate about whether lawyers should be client-centered autonomy
agents or ethically independent actors implicitly rests on a foundational
disagreement in political theory about the nature of citizenship. Those
arguing for independence almost always read legal education and practice
as preparation for the exercise of public leadership. As such, they
differentiate between the requirements and experiences of elite as opposed
to popular forms of participation. In the following sections, I demonstrate
how these arguments resonate with a republican tradition that emphasizes
the benefits of "natural aristocracy."
The consequence is that even
advocates who wish to reconcile professional power with democratic values
inevitably find themselves constructing an apology for political elitism.
These arguments begin from presumptions about the distinctive leadership
capacities of the bar and then proceed to demonstrate how best to situate
such necessary leadership within the framework of equality. As a result,
only client-centered accounts appear to take seriously the democratic
importance of undifferentiated citizenship, but at the cost of claiming that
lawyers should assert minimal discretionary judgment. If the republican
tradition presents lawyers as uniquely capable of wielding collective
authority, the call for client autonomy reaches the opposite, yet equally
problematic, conclusion:
that the profession is the one social group
uniquely disempowered from asserting its voice in public life. In essence,
both approaches to the profession's ethical duties presuppose a political
theory that is incompatible with more substantive accounts of the lawyer's
democratic citizenship.
A. NaturalAristocracy and RepublicanFaith in Lawyers
In order to appreciate how ethical questions about legal practice imply
normative claims about citizenship, it is necessary to take a step back and
look more closely at the republican vision of natural aristocracy. Perhaps
the best place to begin is with the idea's cultural and political emergence in
the years following the American Revolution. During the colonial period, a
common republican position maintained that a well-functioning social order
rested on virtue and thus required that political rulers transcend their own
partiality and act on the basis of the general good. 26 As Lasch wrote,
26. Along with virtue, the other central element of republicanism was the notion of
balance in government.
Following Aristotle's classification, traditional republicans
distinguished regimes by whether they lodged power in the one, the few, or the many, with
each form embodying sources of potential corruption. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITIcS 51-81
(Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988). Thus, the goal of political construction
was "to work out some principle of balance that would combine the advantages of each
while nullifying the features that made them oppressive." LASCH, supra note 6, at 173.
Political theorist Philip Pettit writes that, for classical republicans, government actions
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according to elite republicans, "virtue implied the fullest development of
human capacities and powers. They condemned a life devoted to the
pursuit of wealth and private comforts, not because it was selfish, but
because it provided insufficient scope for the ambition to excel. '2 7 Under
this framework, political activity was both an education in virtue-through
the Aristotelian experience of ruling and being ruled in turn-and the
primary arena for its display. For such republicans, this focus on achieving
excellence through action in the public sphere provoked grave suspicions
about the drive for wealth acquisition or material well-being:
"Republicanism condemned self-seeking when it tempted men to value the
external rewards of excellence more highly than the thing itself or to bend
'28
the rules governing a given practice to their own immediate advantage.
As a result, most members of the polity, especially ordinary laborers, were
too bound to economic necessity-and thus too wedded to material selfinterest-to exercise power in the name of excellence rather than personal
advantage. This politics of virtue meant that a specific social group had to
be separated out and designated as guardians of the larger polity.
In common seventeenth-century English accounts, only those few who
were already wealthy and landed enough to be removed from material
concerns should wield political responsibility. As owners of property, such
elites held a continuous stake in collective life and were best situated to
think in terms of the long-run interests of the larger polity. This linkage
between virtue and property meant that traditional republicans were highly
skeptical of democratic principles of majority rule or of broadening voting
rights beyond a limited community of landholders. As Henry Ireton, Oliver
Cromwell's son-in-law, argued during the 1647 Putney Debates of the
English Civil War, general well-being and social order would crumble if
citizenship was seen as a birthright and suffrage extended to all white
males. Since only landed elites had "a permanent fixed interest in [the]
Kingdome," they alone had the necessary virtue to combine participation
with political excellence. 29 Echoing these sentiments a century and a half
later, Seth Ames, the son of arch-Federalist Fisher Ames, declared that
promoted liberty only "so long as they respect people's common interests and ideas and
conform to the image of an ideal law: so long as they are not the instruments of any one
individual's, or any one group's, arbitrary will." PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY
OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 36 (1997). In other words, the one, the few, and the many
represented factions within society whose interests were not equivalent to the common good.
Thus, true law had to result from a balancing process, in which the creation of a "mixed
regime" would check attempts by partial groups to impose arbitrarily their own will on the
collective. Id. at 20.
27. LASCH, supra note 6, at 174.
28. Id.
29. Barbara Taft, From Reading to Whitehall: Henry Ireton's Journey, in THE PUTNEY
DEBATES OF 1647: THE ARMY, THE LEVELLERS AND THE ENGLISH STATE 175, 184 (Michael
Mendle ed., 2001) (quoting Henry Ireton). The debate between Oliver Cromwell and Henry

Ireton and their more radical officers over the relationship between citizenship and voting
offers one of the great political discussions of equality and political participation. For more
on the Putney Debates, see JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR
INCLUSION 44-46 (1991).
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democracy was little more than class rule by the poor-those too
economically dependent to think in terms of the common weal-and that it
reduced political decision making to "present popular passions, independent
of the public good."'30 Accordingly, statecraft had to be insulated from a
self-interested public and placed in the hands of a virtuous and hereditary
elite.
Nonetheless, for the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, the revolutionary
experience and the increasing political influence of small farmers and
artisans 31 underscored the impossibility of limiting political power to a
coterie of gentry elites and powerful families. The Framers appreciated that
the new political community would have to be grounded in the democratic
principle of majority rule and expand the domains of citizenship and voting.
Still, profound skepticism regarding the capacities and interests of most
ordinary individuals ran deep; as political theorist Sheldon Wolin writes,
"[T]he Founders, almost without exception, believed that democratic
majority rule posed the gravest threat to a republican system." 32 In the
Federalist Papers, James Madison famously remarked that, "Had every
Athenian citizen been a Socrates[,] every Athenian assembly would still
have been a mob."'33 In essence, popular political involvement in the
activity of ruling inevitably reduced the general good to the partisan
commitments of the laboring masses. Thus, the great challenge facing
Madison and others was to devise political institutions that protected
majority rule and yet, at the same time, ensured that collective decision
making would not be held hostage to the vagaries of public opinion. "[I]n
order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude," Madison
believed that it was essential to create a detached national government that
divided sovereignty across multiple branches. 34 Ideally, these institutional
arrangements would limit popular pressure and, as Bruce Ackerman notes,
"economize on virtue"-i.e., reduce the necessity for good government to
35
rest on the public-mindedness and wisdom of ordinary people.
Still, even if the system of government restrained popular power and
successfully economized on virtue, no political framework could ever do
without virtue entirely. To guard against threats to public well-being, there
30. J. T. Kirkland, Memoir, in I WORKS OF FISHER AMES 21 (Seth Ames ed., 1854).

31. Historian Robert Wiebe describes the 1770s and 1780s as a period of rising
egalitarian commitments, marked by the diffusion of political control and the creation of "[a]
multitude of small political units, governmental and quasi-governmental, [which] rushed to
fill the vacuum of British authority, [and] resisted the pulls from patriot capitals almost as
stubbornly as they resisted the British." ROBERT WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN
SOCIETY: FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE EVE OF DISUNION 3 (1984); see
also GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1991) (arguing

that the American Revolution was a deeply radical event because it dramatically increased
social equality among the colonists and undermined preexisting status hierarchies).
32. SHELDON S. WOLIN, DEMOCRACY INCORPORATED: MANAGED DEMOCRACY AND THE
SPECTER OF INVERTED TOTALITARIANISM 229 (2008).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 300 (James Madison) (J. R. Pole ed., 2005).
34. Id.
35. See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 198-99 (1991).
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still needed to be a group within society that stood independent of the
dominant and competing factions and thus remained able to act on the basis
of disinterested and autonomous reflection. For the Founders, prevailing
egalitarian sentiment meant that such public excellence could no longer be
tied to a hereditary aristocracy, grounded in wealth and property and
enjoying special political privileges. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter
to John Adams, the only solution was the creation of a natural aristocracy,
in which those individuals with the greatest "virtue and talents" nurtured
their capacities through proper training and gained election to positions of
leadership.3 6 Jefferson concluded,
The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature for
the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. And indeed it
would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man for the
social state, and not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to
manage the concerns of the society. May we not even say that that form
of government is the best which provides the most effectually 37for a pure
selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government?
In Jefferson's efforts to combine republican commitments to virtue with
the democratic principle of majority rule, he provided the foundation for a
new mode of stratified citizenship. For Ireton, citizenship and political selfrule were the exclusive domain of property owners, depicted as the sole
body with a fixed interest in the community's welfare. By contrast,
Jefferson argued that citizenship was a broad right, carrying far different
responsibilities depending on one's position in society. For the ordinary
laborer, the citizen's basic function was to recognize and elect wise
leaders-those better suited by training and intellect to wield actual
political power. As for the talented few, citizenship meant holding office or
positions of public importance and entailed the exercise of direct political
participation-the Aristotelian vision of ruling and being ruled in turn.
While such republicanism may have done away with hereditary nobility, it
still presumed that collective decision making had to be separated from the
public at large and controlled by responsible elites.
Yet, the question remained: Which social body would provide the
backbone for the new political leadership? Given that lawyers at the
founding, in the words of Robert Gordon, "furnished a disproportionate
share of Revolutionary statesmen, dominated high offices ...

and the

organs of elite literary culture, had more occasions even than ministers for
public oratory, and were the most facile and authoritative interpreters of
laws and constitutions," it followed that they inevitably claimed the mantle
of a natural aristocracy and with it the republican ideal of political
excellence.3 8 As members of a learned profession, bound by practical
36. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28. 1813), in I

THE FOUNDERS'

CONSTITUTION 568-69 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).

37. Id.
38. Gordon, supra note 14, at 14 (citing ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 11, 17, 66-72, 77-78 (1984); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
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knowledge rather than wealth or landed interests, leading lawyers of the age
saw themselves as the entity best able to constrain popular passion and to
protect the republican system of government. Articulating the special
standing of the bar and the presumed need for a natural aristocracy,
Alexander Hamilton wrote,
Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to
the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to
prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far39as
it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society?
While the Federalists themselves never overtly described why groups
such as the bar should assume the responsibilities of political decision
making, Alexis de Tocqueville made explicit the ties between elite
citizenship and specialized education. Tocqueville believed that the United
States was dominated by the two parties that "have divided mankind since
free societies came into existence," namely, the few and the many or the
aristocratic and democratic elements. 40 In his view, lawyers were clearly
members of the elite few and enjoyed "the tastes and habits of an
aristocracy. '4 1 In particular, legal education and training underscored the
distinct social experience and values that constituted the life of a learned
professional as opposed to that of a farmer or wage earner. "Study and
specialized knowledge of the law give a man a rank apart in society and
make of lawyers a somewhat privileged intellectual class. The exercise of
their profession daily reminds them of this superiority; they are the masters
of a necessary and not widely understood science .
"..."42 Moreover,
special education did more than promote a sense of superiority; it provided
training in political decision making that developed both the skills of
rulership and an appropriate skepticism toward the judgment of everyday
laborers. In essence, it made lawyers a natural aristocracy, whose talents,
rather than unearned wealth or sheer power, distinguished them from both
the landed gentry and the broader public. Equipped with this background,
for Tocqueville, lawyers "serve[d] as arbiters between the citizens; and the
habit of directing the blind passions of the litigants toward the objective
[gave] them a certain scorn for the judgment of the crowd. '4 3 He
concluded that the legal profession was the one aristocratic body that could
"unforcedly mingle with elements natural to democracy and combine with
them on comfortable and lasting terms." 44 As a consequence, he believed
that the "permitted influence" of the bar would check the excesses of
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS (1986); MAGALI
SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 283 n.45

(1956)).
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
40. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 178 (J. P. Mayer ed., George

Lawrence trans., 1988).
41. Id. at 264.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 266.
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popular passion and over time provide "the strongest [barrier] against the
'45
faults of democracy.
At the heart of arguments that linked Madison and Hamilton to
Tocqueville was a basic assumption about the irrationality of ordinary
citizens. While the populace embodied an indistinct mass, prey to its own
self-interest and subject to demagoguery, the new natural aristocracy was
taken to be composed of "rational actors," 46 who, in the words of Sheldon
Wolin, "weigh counterevidence carefully, employ power judiciously, and,
above all, consider the consequences of a course of action, especially if it
involves grave risks or harm." 47 This distinction between the abilities of
learned professionals and citizens indicated a troubling distaste for the
attitudes of most Americans, who were depicted as fundamentally
incorrigible. Equally disconcerting, it rested on the proposition that entities
such as the bar, itself rife with partiality and self-seeking behavior, could
and properly should embody a universal class. Still, as the next sections
explore, despite these normative shortcomings, versions of republican
elitism have come to dominate current defenses of the lawyer's moral and
political independence in legal ethics.
B. The Lawyer-Statesman and Elite Despondency
Potentially the most well-known defense of the lawyer's moral and
political independence, presented by Anthony Kronman's The Lost Lawyer,
relies heavily on such elite republicanism. Kronman's primary concern
revolves around whether legal practice continues to be a noble calling or
48
has instead devolved into a form of expert labor indifferent to social ends.
He views the debate in legal ethics about how to balance duties to clients
with those to the public writ large as suggesting a much more profound
"crisis of values"-one that goes to the heart of the professional
experience. 49 In reality, however, this existential crisis is limited to the
most prestigious elements of the bar, some of whom worry that the
profession no longer plays the role of the natural aristocracy imagined by
Hamilton and Tocqueville. These arguments may well be right about the
decline of a service ethic in the profession. Yet, by tying a defense of the
lawyer's independence to the reclamation of her lost status as a social
guardian, the statesmanship discourse ends up presenting autonomous
reflection and moral deliberation as the purview of elite actors.

45. Id. at 263.
46. WOLIN, supra note 32, at 182.

47. Id.
48. This is not unlike a series of empirical studies in the sociology of the profession also
published in the mid-1990s. Of particular note are BRINT, supra note 20, and ELLIOT A.
KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM,

1930 TO THE PRESENT (1996), which each argue that professional work as a whole is
increasingly transforming into expertise-for-hire due to market pressures and changes in
state policy.
49. KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 4.
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In Kronman's account, legal practice today seems reduced to an adjunct
of either business or government, and lawyers are neither publicly minded
statesmen nor even centrally motivated by this ideal. Kronman argues that
attorneys face a deep uneasiness that "is the product of growing doubts
about the capacity of a lawyer's life to offer fulfillment to the person who
takes it up"50 and for the professional to be not just "an accomplished
technician but a person of prudence or practical wisdom as well. '5 1 He
hearkens back to an earlier period when lawyers took pride in the intrinsic
worth of their profession, which at its best embodied the character virtues of
independence, political sensitivity, and moderation. Rather than being
bound to client interest, professionalism in this era emphasized "the need
for deliberative judgment and a public-spirited concern for the good of the
law as a whole." 52 Echoing these sentiments, the late Chief Justice William
Rehnquist lamented that, while great lawyers like Thomas Jefferson,
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Marshall, and Abraham Lincoln
"played a vital, perhaps a transcendent, role in steering the ship of state
through the shoals that confronted it," most successful attorneys in
contemporary life appeared uninterested in the greater good or public
53
service.
Despite the claim that legal practice as a whole faces a crisis of values
and morale, Kronman overstates professional unhappiness among most
lawyers. In the bar generally, there are few signs of existential malaise.
Rather than mourning the loss of a noble calling, a slate of recent studies
finds that practitioners are overwhelmingly content with their career
choices. Data tracking attorneys who were admitted to the bar in 2000
reported that 80% of respondents expressed satisfaction with their
occupation, leading the researchers to conclude that "there is no evidence in
the AJD [(After the JD)] data of any pervasive unhappiness in the
profession." 54 Such statistics mirror the findings of John Heinz and his
coauthors in their far-reaching work on lawyers in Chicago. 55 If anything,
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 167 (citing Maxwell Bloomfield, Law and Lawyers in American Popular
Culture, in LAW AND AMERICAN LITERATURE: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 132-43 (Carl S.
Smith et al. eds., 1983)).
53. William H. Rehnquist, The Lawyer-Statesman in American History, 9 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 537, 537 (1986).
54.

RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF

LEGAL CAREERS 47 (2004).
55. See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE

BAR 257 (2005) [hereinafter HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS] (reporting that a 1995 survey
revealed that 84% of all Chicago lawyers were satisfied or very satisfied with their work). In
a previous article, John Heinz and his coauthors describe as "dreadful" most of the evidence
cited for the low morale of lawyers. John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers and Their Discontents:
Findingsfrom a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74 IND. L.J. 735, 736 (1999).

They see the

declension thesis as a stock narrative of the profession, with little grounding in current
circumstances. Id. at 735 n.3. "Every generation of lawyers appears to think that the golden
era of the bar occurred just before they entered it. (Understandably, however, they never
make the obvious cause-and-effect inference.)" Id.
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the central concern of most ordinary lawyers is that monetary rewards and
career options are deeply stratified between an elite bar where "business is
booming" and a lower tier of solo and small-firm practitioners. 56 Among
the latter groups, inflation-adjusted income has actually remained flat since
the 1980s or, for some, has even dropped in the last five years. 57 Today,
more and more recent law graduates who do not finish at the top of their
class or attend highly ranked schools find themselves "taking temporary
contract work, reviewing documents for as little as $20 an hour, without
benefits." 58 For these attorneys, who took out sizeable student loans on the
promise of enjoying big firm salaries, the hope was precisely to become
well-paid expert laborers. Thus, their problem with the profession is not the
collapse of meaning but a lack of opportunities and an unequal division of
59
the spoils.
In a sense, worries about the future of law as a noble calling speak more
to despondency among the elite bar than to any generalized dissatisfaction.
Writing and commentary in this vein has been the product of the most
distinguished voices within the profession, including Supreme Court
justices, law school deans, and bar association task forces. 60 One could
argue that this despondency reflects status anxiety among top lawyers, who
fear that their professional respectability and social standing have become
compromised by market dictates and state supervision. Social critic and
nonlawyer Fareed Zakaria, in his book The Future of Freedom, powerfully
encapsulates these concerns about the bar's lost authority. He concludes,
"[L]ook at America's professional elites-lawyers, most notably-who
once formed a kind of local aristocracy with duties and responsibilities
toward their towns and cities. They 1 have lost their prestige and public
6
purpose, becoming anxious hustlers."
56. See Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY

287, 287 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
57. Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job Market Wanes for U.S. Law~yers, WALL ST. J., Sept.
24, 2007, at Al.
58. Id.
59. Amir Efrati's evocative piece in the Wall Street Journalcaptures the experience and
fears of one recent graduate of Chicago-Kent College of Law. Id. "Despite graduating near
the top half of her class, she has been unable to find a job and is doing temp work
'essentially as a paralegal,' she says. 'A lot of people, including myself, feel frustrated about
the lack of jobs,' she says." Id. (quoting Sue Clark, 2007 graduate of Chicago-Kent School
of Law).
60. A classic illustration of this elite despondency comes from the late Chief Justice
Warren Burger's famous lament that lawyers suffered from a "decline in public confidence"
because they had repudiated their obligations to the public good and thus faced a crisis of
professionalism. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62, 62. As
other representative examples see, MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 85108 (1994); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS
(1998); Am. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Professionalism, ".... In the Spirit of Public Service:"
A Blueprintfor the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986); Hazard,
supra note 1; Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv.
283 (1998).
61. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND
ABROAD 23 (2003).
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The trouble with this line of reasoning is that even if lawyers today
amount to "anxious hustlers" and are no longer "transcendent" statesmen,
this fact does not self-evidently pose a broader social problem-especially
in a society committed to democratic equality. It might raise existential
concerns for top lawyers who see themselves as political guardians, but
their reduced social standing could arguably bring with it the elevation of
popular citizenship. In order to present the "crisis of values" as an actual
social problem, Kronman and others find themselves presupposing the
necessity of elite rule. According to the statesmanship discourse, the bar's
elite will inevitably exercise political control and is in fact essential to the
maintenance of a stable and healthy social order. Therefore, the current
dilemma is not a growing divide between administrative experts who enjoy
the privileges of leadership and most citizens who are increasingly
separated from political power, but that elites have become less capable
leaders. Kronman writes,
In the future, the legal profession will continue to supply a large
percentage of the country's political leaders. But the demise of the
lawyer-statesman ideal means that the lawyers who lead the country will
on the whole be less qualified to do so than before. They will be less
prudence or practical
likely to possess the traits of character-the 62
wisdom-that made them good leaders in the past.
Rather than allowing the disappearance of "practical wisdom" among
professional elites to raise foundational questions about the appropriateness
of stratified citizenship, these arguments persist in hoping that lawyers can
be made better rulers. Thus, when Kronman calls for a legal practice
oriented toward "the good of the law as a whole," his call rests on an
explicitly antidemocratic stance that divides elite and ordinary participation.
Following the old republican vision, moral independence is considered to
be an essential characteristic of virtuous rulership. Thus, its defense
through the lawyer-statesman ideal takes for granted both that lawyers
should be elite citizens and that politics should be organized around a
distinction between the few and the many. In doing so, such claims
abandon the ground of democratic legitimacy entirely to those who
emphasize client autonomy and are opposed to an ethic of independence.
They also ignore a critical reason for the profession's loss of popular
reputation. What disturbs many Americans is not merely that lawyers use
their influence poorly, but that the bar seems to exercise such profound
influence in the first place.
C. The People's Lawyer and the CountermajoritarianTurn
It should be noted that not all accounts of the lawyer's moral and political
independence are grounded in an elite discourse of statesmanship or are
principally concerned with whether lawyering remains a natural aristocracy.

62.

KRONMAN,

supra note 19, at 4.
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Scholars like Robert Gordon, William Simon, and David Luban selfconsciously seek to make the exercise of the lawyer's independent
63
judgment compatible with democratic institutions and commitments.
Each sees the most grandiose claims about the profession's capacity for
political leadership and its noble calling as antidemocratic defenses of legal
privilege, based on historical suspicions of the poor and disenfranchised.
For example, Gordon rejects as "ridiculous" the idea that "lawyers belong
to a distinct elevated estate uniquely endowed with political wisdom and
insight into everybody's long-term best interests." 64 He refuses to read
legal independence as an argument for elite empowerment and writes that
"lawyering is not a club for superhumans, and that especially in this century
lawyers have been joined, and in many areas of political life displaced, by
65
rival interpreters and articulators and mediators of social purposes."
Moreover, these scholars turn to Louis Brandeis's seminal 1905 lecture
before the Harvard Ethical Society, entitled The Opportunityin the Law, for
their model of the "people's lawyer" and seek to make professional
independence an instrument for the fulfillment of popular needs and
interests. 66 But by claiming Brandeis as their inspiration, such arguments
also fall prey to Brandeis's own wariness of unchecked popular power.
They carry through his vision of the people's lawyer as someone who
stands above ordinary citizens, and whose technical skill allows her to
shape public demands.
On its face, the desire to see legal practice as a means for articulating
collective grievances appears far removed from the politics of legal
statesmanship. If anything, it ties the people's lawyer as much to the
tradition of social movement organizing as it does to that of ordinary legal
craft-a move to which I am quite sympathetic, as will be discussed later.
For Simon and Luban, the lawyer's independence and professional
discretion are essential political tools that, when exercised properly,
enhance the agency and social power of marginalized groups. Luban
pictures lawyers and mass publics as ideally engaged in projects of "mutual
political commitment," 6 7 and Simon presents the lawyer as an organizer

63. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 14; SIMON, supra note 60; Gordon, supra note 14.
64. Gordon, supra note 14, at 74.

65. Id. at 75.
66. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address Before the Harvard Ethical

Society (May 4, 1905), in BUSINEss-A PROFESSION 329 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1996)
(1914). All three scholars have been deeply influenced by Louis Brandeis's lecture. Robert
Gordon uses it at the beginning of The Independence of Lawyers as a definitive example of
the professional ethic of independence. Gordon, supra note 14, at 2. He also ends a more
recent article on the state of the profession by returning to Brandeis's vision of the
"opportunity in the law" and the importance of lawyers to be more than autonomy agents for
clients. Gordon, supra note 56, at 331. William Simon's account of "ethical discretion"
draws directly from Brandeis's view of lawyering for the situation. Simon, supra note 14, at
1122. Finally, David Luban's account of how to reconcile the lawyer's moral activism with
democratic ideals is explicitly presented as an updating of Brandeis's "people's lawyer."
LUBAN, supra note 14, at 169-74.
67. LUBAN, supra note 14, at 329-35.
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who "structures a situation to induce a sense of common interest, hope, and
potency among the people she is trying to organize. '68
In the end, however, rather than repudiating a politics of stratified
citizenship, the ideal of the people's lawyer simply devolves into a softer
version of the legal guardian. Like the statesmanship discourse, it reverts to
a defense of professional independence in which the lawyer's discretion
constrains the vicissitudes of popular self-rule. For instance, Luban argues
that in class action cases, there often exists intergenerational conflict
between the interests of present groups and those of future ones. In this
context, lawyers must use their independent judgment "to create the best
possible world," even if this contradicts the wishes of existing clients. 69 As
his example, Luban discusses Derrick Bell's famous article, Serving Two
Masters, in which Bell suggests that the effort by the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) attorneys to pursue a
vision of justice rather than the actual goals of their clients led them to file
class action lawsuits aimed at desegregating schools-even though many
black parents preferred improvements in educational quality to
integration. 70 Luban defends the attorneys on intergenerational grounds,
arguing that the parents of the community engaged in short-sighted thinking
and that "it is surely in the best interests of future generations to live in an
integrated society."'7 1 In so concluding, Luban appears to ignore that the
parents were also making pragmatic political judgments about the likely
outcomes of various competing strategies. In particular, such parents
worried that the backlash fostered by forced busing would produce a worstcase scenario, in which educational quality dropped in local schools and
integration was never properly achieved. It is an open and deeply contested
question whether the parents or Luban have ultimately been correct about
the best interests of future generations. By simply dismissing parental
judgments out of hand, Luban falls into the trap of presuming that lawyers
are somehow better equipped than their clients to make difficult political
decisions. In the process, his argument for professional independence
replicates precisely what Bickel viewed as the root of the
countermajoritarian difficulty-it trumps the will of "the actual people of
the here and now" with the deliberative judgment of elite actors. 72 The
consequence is that, like the ideal of the lawyer-statesman, the people's
lawyer also too often rests on an apology for legal privilege, with
professional independence viewed as essential for directing and
constraining popular voice.
This tendency within the discourse of the people's lawyer derives from
the fact that proponents never actually situate legal discretion in a set of
68. Simon, supra note 18, at 1108.
69. LUBAN, supra note 14, at 348.
70. Id. at 347-48 (discussing Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976)).
71. Id.
72. BICKEL, supra note 10, at 17.
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clear substantive goals. While asserting the value of ethical autonomy in
the abstract, Luban and others are wary of providing a thick moral ethos to
guide legal practice. The result is that people's lawyering often only
provides a formal defense of legal independence-it gives little sense of the
social community within which lawyers should be embedded or the
practical ends that should govern independent judgment. This formalism
means that when proponents seek to explain how professional independence
operates, they tend to fall back on claims that legal practice and education
somehow translate into enhanced capacities for prudence and ethical
deliberation. Without a democratic political theory to direct the exercise of
professional discretion, the lawyer becomes exalted as a political actor
capable of constraining the competing elements in society. At its most
extreme, people's lawyering collapses-almost by
default-into a system73
preserving function that checks popular impulses.
These problems are powerfully illustrated by Brandeis's own accounts of
democracy and legal practice. At key junctures, Brandeis reproduces the
classic distinction between the few and the many, and ties the lawyer's
independent judgment to the supposed leadership capacities of attorneys. In
drawing from Brandeis and in failing to move beyond formal defenses,
Luban, as well as Gordon and Simon, unwittingly reinscribe the vision of
elite authority that they otherwise take pains to condemn. For Brandeis, the
primary reason why lawyers were capable of thinking in terms of a greater
good and "of holding a position of independence, between the wealthy and
the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either," derived from their
unique professional skills fostered by higher education and practical
experience. 74 These skills allowed the bar to remain a republican respite of
prudence and practical wisdom in a broader social context of economic selfinterest and factional conflict. In his opinion, the essence of legal
training-as distinct from ordinary education-was the "the development
of judgment," in which attorneys learned the value of "patient research and
develop[ed] both the memory and the reasoning faculties." 7 5 Such
professional education gave attorneys special capacities for rising above
discord and for pursuing right policy rather than divisive politics. For
Brandeis, it was this "training [that] fits [the lawyer] especially to grapple
with the questions which are presented in a democracy. '76 He believed that
the lawyer's knowledge of law as a social science produced a set of moral
characteristics that distinguished the legal profession from other forms of
work. It made attorneys ideally suited to wielding political power and to
enjoying the responsibilities of elite citizenship. According to Brandeis, the
73. In spirit, this argument is similar to Russell Pearce's critique of the "legal profession
as a blue state," in which he sees liberal public philosophy's wariness of embedding moral
values in the public sphere as partly responsible for the profession's supposed crisis of
meaning. See Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public
Philosophy, Jurisprudence,and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAm L. REV. 1339, 1342-43 (2007).
74. Brandeis, supra note 66, at 337.
75. Id. at 331.
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lawyer "is an observer of men even more than of things. He not only sees
men of all kinds, but knows their deepest secrets; sees them in situations
which try men's souls. He is apt to become a good judge of men."' 77
Albeit in a more gentle form, these arguments embodied an earlytwentieth-century updating of the long-standing republican position. Even
the call to train people's lawyers by no means took the further step of
assuming that most citizens should actually direct political decision making.
Rather, the people's lawyer acted on behalf of the best interest of ordinary
individuals and guided political life so that mass politics would not devolve
into chaos. For Brandeis, while the public good should take account of the
problems facing wage earners and agricultural workers, both corporations
and the laboring masses were overly devoted to their partial interests and
thus liable to reduce collective life to conflict and disorder. Surveying the
industrial strife around him, Brandeis hoped that attorneys acting as social
experts could steer society toward a stable accommodation.
Like
Tocqueville before him, Brandeis viewed the bar as the institutional entity
best situated in a democracy to constrain the destructive impulses of
popular power. Speaking to his fellow lawyers of the threats posed by mass
politics, he concluded,
The people's thought will take shape in action; and it lies with us, with
you to whom in part the future belongs, to say on what lines the action is
to be expressed; whether it is to be expressed wisely and temperately, or
wildly and intemperately; whether it is to be expressed on lines of
78
evolution or on lines of revolution.
In these few sentences, Brandeis echoed Madison's fear of the
"intemperance of a multitude" and acceded completely to the distinction
between elite virtue and mass irrationality.
In locating contemporary defenses of independence within the tradition
of a people's lawyer, Gordon, Simon, and Luban never squarely confront
the republican discourse of elite citizenship on which this tradition is based.
In fact, at times, they too ground a professional ethic of public service on
the same arguments about the bar's special capacities. When justifying
why lawyers can be trusted to use their judgment to act on the best future
interests of clients, Luban returns to the old republican theme of elite
leadership. As part of his discussion of Brandeis in Lawyers and Justice,
Luban concludes, "But it is not too farfetched to expect that legal training
with its cultivation of practical judgment should enable lawyers to form a
better picture of the human consequences of institutional arrangements than
can those of us who have no comparable training. '79 By failing to find a
substantive ethical ground for structuring a vision of professional
independence, such arguments in favor of the bar's independent judgment
are inevitably trapped by the countermajoritarian difficulty. Thus, for all

77. Id. at 332 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 343.
79. LUBAN, supra note 14, at 171.
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the dissimilarities between the ideal of the lawyer-statesman and that of the
people's lawyer, both find themselves offering an apology for professional
power. Given the apparent inconsistencies between lawyer discretion and
popular self-rule, defending independence reduces to an effort to
rehabilitate the profession's legitimacy-in some cases by simply
reasserting old presumptions about elite capacities. As the following
section indicates, this leaves the client-centered position as the only ethical
stance seemingly untainted by a democratic deficit.
D. Lawyer Dominationand the Callfor ClientAutonomy
Echoing popular critiques of the profession as an unaccountable elite,
client-centered approaches to legal ethics also make strange academic
bedfellows of the Left and the Right. What unites these scholars is a
common view that professional discretion amounts to an illegitimate
imposition of lawyer ends on clients. While these arguments oppose an
elite discourse of differentiated citizenship, they reduce democracy solely to
electoral mechanisms or present accounts of citizenship that disconnect
work life from political participation. The consequence is that they too fail
to ground legal ethics in a political theory that links the lawyer's role to the
requirements of a democratic culture.
In the field of poverty law, academics and practitioners argue against the
notion of a people's lawyer committed to the best interests of marginalized
groups, holding that such "lawyer driven decision-making" actually has the
reverse effect of further diminishing the ability of those disadvantaged to
assert their own political voice.80 These scholars reject a professional ethic
based on the attorney's independent judgment and focus instead on
developing methods for "client empowerment. 8 1 They see ideals of
independence and "disinterestedness embedded in traditional lawyering
approaches" as means by which lawyers substitute their own goals for those
of poor clients, in the process restraining, rather than facilitating, popular
self-rule. 8 2 In their view, given the inevitable countermajoritarian difficulty
faced by an ethic of independence, the only way to conform legal practice
to democratic values is by refraining from efforts to structure client
objectives. As Derrick Bell concludes in his discussion of NAACP
lawyers, to do otherwise would constitute both inadequate representation
and a profound form of democratic disrespect. Instead of "undertaking
responsibilities that should be determined by their clients and shaped by the
80. Ruth Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Difference in Poverty Law
Scholarship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1025 (1994); see also GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING:

ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992).

Scott

Cummings and Ingrid Eagly provide an essential summary of much of the writing in this
vein. Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A CriticalReflection on Law and Organizing,
48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 458 (2001) ("Poverty lawyers were characterized as potential
'oppressors' who actually contributed to the subordination of their disadvantaged clients by
forcing them to rely on the lawyers' expertise.").
81. Cummings & Eagly, supra note 80, at 459.
82. Buchanan, supra note 80, at 1026.
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community," he maintains that "[i]t is essential that lawyers 'lawyer' and
not attempt to lead clients and class." 83 Similarly, poverty law scholar Ruth
Buchanan argues for abandoning presumptions about the value of
independent judgment and, as the only democratic option for lawyers,
working "to rethink [one's] own advocacy efforts in nonhierarchical
84
ways."
Legal academics on the other side of the political divide, who champion
the value of the free market, have reached virtually identical ethical
conclusions. For example, Charles Fried views the belief that professional
work should be marked by a disinterested commitment to the public good
as "nonsense on stilts" and holds that the notion that attorneys have "a kind
of distance, judgment and almost academic posture toward the law which
allows them to serve clients particularly well" amounts to "a self-serving
fantasy." 85 For Fried, the idea that lawyers provide a public function,
which should temper one's duty of client loyalty, carries with it
unacceptable aristocratic assumptions. It presupposes that lawyers are
somehow better skilled than ordinary Americans in making collective
judgments. In his opinion, the only individuals who have the legitimate
authority to make social decisions on behalf of others are elected
representatives. Since the bar has no similar democratic credibility, lawyers
should not imagine themselves as political guardians; rather, they should
operate as service providers in a legal market and orient their practice to
fulfilling client goals. Fried asserts that, not only does this market-driven
ethic provide the best quality of legal service, but also that its flourishing
indicates the community's democratic health. According to Fried, the
belief that political life requires "a mediating priesthood between the
regulators and the regulated is itself a sign of social illness," suggesting
deep distrust among professional elites for the everyday functioning of
86
elected institutions.
Yet, as proponents of moral and political independence have illustrated in
great detail, client-centered accounts are riddled with ethical and practical
difficulties. Robert Gordon emphasizes that the drive for client autonomy
rests on a basic implausibility: the notion that both client interests and the
law's self-evident meaning are fully formed in advance of legal consultation
and thus all that lawyers must do is translate these interests into terms
judicially accessible. 87 By contrast, he underscores the irreducible
discretion at the heart of legal practice, since even this process of translation
generally requires the competent attorney to offer
a number of possible alternatives that until that moment might never have
been thought of, then asking for a ranking of alternatives, and then
83. Bell, supra note 70, at 512.
84. Buchanan, supra note 80, at 1026.
85. Charles Fried, The Trouble with Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,

(Magazine), at 56, 56.
86. Id.
87. Gordon, supra note 14, at 72-73.
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estimating the possible consequences of each. Through this back-andforth dialectical interaction, both the client's 'interests' and the 'law'
governing the situation will gradually take the shapes sculpted by the
88
social agents who interpret and transmit them.
In this inherently dialectical encounter, having lawyers employ their own
"political judgments," which advocates of client autonomy view as
illegitimate acts of domination, is "virtually inescapable.'89 William
Simon goes so far as to refer to the fact that "effective lawyers cannot avoid
making judgments in terms of their own values and influencing their clients
to adopt those judgments" as "The Dark Secret of Progressive
Lawyering." 90 In other words, even when lawyers believe that they are
simply following the predetermined goals of their clients, they are still
constructing the meaning of these goals. For Simon and Gordon, faith in
client autonomy provides no end-run around the inevitable discretion
embedded in legal work.
Just as problematically, client-centered approaches, while claiming the
mantle of democratic legitimacy, carry with them a remarkably hollow
account of citizenship. For example, Fried's vision of democracy may not
stratify citizenship between virtuous elites and irrational publics, but it too
is premised on a truncated account of popular participation. For Fried, most
Americans simply pursue their private interests through the market and are
utterly unconstrained by commitments to the general good. Rather than
envisioning a collective responsibility that colors all aspects of one's public
life, he implies that only elected representatives are tasked with the work of
maintaining the vitality of political and economic institutions. Under this
view, democratic equality among social groups, and between lawyers and
their clients, means that all are equally indifferent to the public interest.
The people writ large merely pursue their own ends and displace concern
for shared practices onto selected representatives. Rather than elevating
everyone to the level of practical decision maker-regardless of group or
professional status-Fried's market-oriented approach seems to do away
with citizenship entirely as a meaningful popular category.
As for fears of client domination arising from the Left, these also appear
to embrace consequences that in fact undermine more robust possibilities
for democracy. In particular, the concern with client empowerment in its
own way ignores the persistent inequalities in bargaining position and
resources between dominant social groups and those less privileged. As
Simon makes clear, in actual practice, lawyers for wealthy individuals and
corporations do far more than just translate client interests: "they assist
them in reflecting on their goals by offering a detached perspective, they
give strategic advice, and they try to persuade third parties to support the
client." 9 1 Asking attorneys for the disenfranchised to limit their own
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 73.
Id. at 26.
Simon, supra note 18, at 1102.
Id. at 1105.
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discretionary judgment means reducing the already scarce resources of the
disadvantaged. While this may create the fiction of a nonhierarchical
exchange between lawyer and client, it ignores the very reason that those
without access to networks of legal and political power seek out lawyers in
the first place-for advice when placed in situations of great vulnerability.
Just as with market-oriented defenses of client autonomy, radical arguments
employ democratic language to reach conclusions that compromise actual
democratic values. In this case, they seem to ask those lawyers most
committed to enhancing the strength and social voice of marginalized
communities to serve these interests without the benefit of their own
considered judgment and knowledge-with one hand effectively tied
behind their back.
In the end, though, it is not surprising that both radical and free market
versions of the client-centered account share similar intuitions-in
particular, the notion that lawyer discretion is democratically illegitimate.
As previous sections have explored, there no doubt exist antidemocratic
elements in accounts of the attorney as an independent moral actor, even in
those arguments that call for a people's lawyer. Given the parameters of the
prevailing debate in legal ethics, we are left with a set of seemingly
inescapable questions. Is it possible to defend legal independence without
relying on an underlying vision that separates between elite and ordinary
citizenship? Is the only way to avoid the profession's countermajoritarian
difficulty to transform the lawyer into a scribe or functionary of client
interests regardless of the larger social costs? Without a richer theory of
democratic culture, the debate over the profession's ethical commitments
necessarily reinscribes this binary, in which lawyers must decide between
democracy and moral autonomy but cannot have both. Part II seeks a way
out of this impasse, but not through an alternative conception of the
lawyer's practical duties. Instead, it attempts to situate the lawyer's ethical
independence within a broader political theory, one which links to a longstanding American tradition that usefully draws out the responsibilities of
citizenship in work and politics.
II. THE LAWYER AS DEMOCRATIC LABORER

Within the lawyer-statesman discourse, the view that work autonomy is
crucial to a fulfilling professional life is central to the desire to protect legal
practice as a noble calling. Rather than being distinct from public life, the
workplace for both the people's lawyer and the lawyer-statesman is a key
site for the expression of one's social values and for the activity of
citizenship.
While such arguments for ethical independence rightly
maintain the importance and inevitability of discretionary judgment in legal
practice, they hardly ever base their claims on a general defense of
workplace autonomy in all its professional and nonprofessional settings.
Instead, advocates of morally reflective lawyering often fall into the trap of
reading the discretionary nature of legal work as both distinctive and a
justification for elite leadership. Client-centered accounts take just the
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opposite tack, viewing the lawyer's discretionary judgment as a democratic
threat. Rather than seeing work as the ethical foundation of political life,
they present the two as essentially unconnected. Moreover, as opposed to
imagining ways to make the experience of professional autonomy a more
generalized condition, they attempt to limit those few sites that do remain
for the expression of workplace independence. Both approaches seem to
have lost sight of what previous Americans once saw as the heart of the
democratic experiment.
For an American political tradition that linked Abraham Lincoln to
Jacksonian Democrats, independent judgment at work was considered the
essence of free citizenship. Such thinkers believed that a democratic
society could not be marked by a distinction between a laboring mass and a
class of educated decision makers. Rather than viewing the lawyer's
capacity for independent judgment as the unique privilege of the learned,
they sought to infuse all forms of labor with similar opportunities for moral
deliberation and to imagine legal practice itself as one of many arenas of
productive work. In the following pages, I discuss how these arguments
about the inseparability of learning and labor connected to broader
expectations for robust citizenship. Jacksonian and Jeffersonian critiques of
the bar did not revolve around the legitimacy of independent judgment, but
rather focused on the bar's assumption that it embodied a distinct caste that
enjoyed a monopoly on knowledge and deliberative authority. According
to radical Jeffersonian writers, these sentiments of a unique role actually
weakened autonomy and had the reverse effect of tying the profession more
closely to moneyed interests and distancing it from justice and the public
good. Thus, instead of repudiating the lawyer's ethical commitments, as do
some democratic critics of today's bar, this previous tradition viewed
workplace independence more generally, including lawyer independence, as
essential to a vibrant democratic culture. In recovering such arguments, I
hope to move defenses of the lawyer as a moral agent beyond their reliance
on an elite republican theory of politics.
A. Dewey, Lincoln, and the Ideal of Independence
In the early decades of the twentieth century, philosopher John Dewey
surveyed a political landscape that had shifted dramatically since his
Vermont youth in the 1860s and 1870s. Corporate concentration had
drastically undermined popular power, and the new modes of mass
communication similarly compromised the ability of ordinary citizens to
intervene cogently in politics.
Moreover, these developments were
reinforced by the rise of state bureaucracies and heightened governmental
centralization. In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey referred to the new
social paradigm as the "Great Society," an impersonal and increasingly
authoritarian end product of the machine age and technological
development. 92 In response, Dewey hearkened back to a long-standing
92. See JOHN DEWEY,

THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS

126-27 (1927).
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democratic tradition that sought to instill the principle and practice of direct
popular control within all collective institutions. He wrote of the promise
of democracy,
From the standpoint of the individual, it consists in having a responsible
share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the
groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the
values which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it
of a group in harmony
demands liberation of the potentialities of members
93
with the interests and goods which are common.
For Dewey, the democratic project was, at base, an effort in expanding the
conditions of independence, ensuring that everyone had the opportunity to
exercise discretion over which moral ends to pursue, whether in economic
or political life. Throughout the nineteenth century, such ethically directed
work had been referred to as "free labor," or as political theorist Michael
Sandel writes, "labor carried out under conditions likely to cultivate the
qualities of character that suit citizens to self-government. '94 By exploring
what Dewey, and before him Abraham Lincoln, imagined by free labor, we
can develop a better sense of how legal practice can connect to ideals of
equal and authentic citizenship.
For Dewey, the necessity that all individuals achieve moral independence
at work and in politics meant that there could exist no permanent class of
laborers, who went through life solely as dependent employees or rural
The problem with such activity was that it disconnected
tenants.
independent judgment and ethical reflection from everyday economic
practices. In Democracy and Education, he argued that a truly democratic
community had to combine the activity of "producing commodities and
rendering service" with the experience of "self-directive thought. '95 Under
this view, democracy was more than simply a form of government; it was a
general mode of social life that took as its basis the contention that all
citizens should continuously engage in autonomous deliberation and thus
cultivate the habits of self-discipline and hard work. In particular, a
commitment to universalizing moral independence meant doing away with
old notions of a divide between virtuous elites and irrational publics, which
cleaved "society into a learned and an unlearned class, a leisure and a
laboring class." 96 With the aid of a reconstructed educational system that
intertwined "culture and utility," 9 7 Dewey hoped to transform individuals
into both laborers and thinkers capable of asserting a free and ethical will in
public life. This required rejecting all forms of aristocracy, "natural" or
otherwise, including what he viewed as the most pernicious-the
93. Id. at 147.
94. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 169 (1996).
95. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF EDUCATION 299 (1916).

96. Id. at 298.
97. Id.
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emergence of a distinct class of professionals that saw learning as their
exclusive possession. As he concluded,
The price that democratic societies will have to pay for their continuing
health is the elimination of an oligarchy-the most exclusive and
dangerous of all-that attempts to monopolize the benefits of intelligence
and of the best methods for the profit of a few privileged ones, while
practical labor, requiring less spiritual effort and less initiative, remains
the lot of the great majority. 98
In rejecting any division between learning and labor, 99 Dewey situated
himself as an intellectual heir to no less a central political figure than
Abraham Lincoln. In Lincoln's 1859 Address Before the Wisconsin State
Agricultural Society, he argued that the "mud-sill theory" was more than
simply a defense of slavery; it was also a claim about the imprudence of
combining independent judgment with ordinary labor.' 0 0 He declared, "By
the 'mud-sill' theory it is assumed that labor and education are
incompatible" and that "the education of laborers, is not only useless, but
pernicious, and dangerous."' 0 1 Such education enhanced the intemperance
and passions of the multitude and threatened the capacity of prudent elites
to exercise collective power.
Under the "mud-sill" theory, Lincoln
continued, "it is... deemed a misfortune that laborers should have heads at
all," which are "regarded as explosive materials, only to be safely kept in
damp places, as far as possible from that peculiar sort of fire which ignites
02
them."1
According to Lincoln, this view was premised on "[t]he old general
rule.., that educated people did not perform manual labor. They managed

98. JOHN DEWEY, Educationfrom a Social Perspective, in 7 THE MIDDLE WORKS, 18991924, at 111, 127 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1979).

99. 1 draw the phrase "learning and labor" from Christopher Lasch's excellent and
formative essay Opportunity in the Promised Land, discussing the relationship between the
two concepts in American political thought. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, Opportunity in the
PromisedLand: Social Mobility or the Democratization of Competence?, in THE REVOLT OF
THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 50, 50-79 (1995).

In Lasch's account, these

arguments suggest that professional work, since it is not manual, is ultimately outside the
framework of free labor. Id. at 60-61 (emphasizing how free labor combines mind and
"muscle" and thus is crucially tied to manual work). It leads Lasch to the nostalgic and
counterproductive conclusion of decrying "the reign of specialized expertise" and with it
most forms of specialized knowledge as threats to the democratic community of small

producers. Id. at 79. As the remaining sections explore, I think this overlooks how broadly
Americans imagined the category of free labor as well as the efforts by thinkers and political
actors throughout the nineteenth century to make professional work-particularly legal
practice-consistent with notions of universal moral independence. For more on how
America hoped to democratize education and to link knowledge and autonomous reflection
to work life, see ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970).

100. See Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Sept. 30, 1859), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

471, 477-78 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
101. Id. at 479.
102. Id.
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to eat their bread, leaving the toil of producing it to the uneducated."',0 3 In
sharp contrast, the belief in free labor and moral independence took for
granted the value of "universal education," in which all individuals were
raised to the level of deliberative and knowledgeable citizens. 104 Lincoln
maintained that, "as the Author of man makes every individual with one
head and one pair of hands, it was probably intended that heads and hands
should cooperate as friends; and that that particular head[] should direct and
control that particular pair of hands."' 1 5 Emphasizing the need to unite
labor and learning, and to ensure that everyone participate in the practices
of independent ethical judgment at work and in politics, Lincoln concluded,
"[E]ach head is the natural guardian, director, and protector of the hands
and mouth inseparably connected with it; and that being so, every head
should be cultivated, and improved, by whatever will add to its capacity for
10 6
performing its charge."'
Today, the tendency is to see arguments in favor of universal education
as tied to a belief that all Americans should have the opportunity to rise in
social standing. This suggests that a democratic culture is one in which
those most talented from all walks of life enjoy status as learned
professionals, creating a true natural aristocracy based on merit and skill.
For example, Gordon makes precisely this point in defending the value of
the lawyer's independent judgment. While he admits that "the service ethic
originated in the ideology of a privileged class" and that it "continued to
justify the privileges of that class even when most of its members did little
to live up to it," he argues that the bar itself has been thoroughly
democratized in recent years.' 0 7 Since legal education and practice are now
pursued by communities long marginalized, a profession oriented toward
the public interest no longer presumes that only specific social groups
should exercise power. "[L]awyers who seek fulfillment in public service
are the children of patricians, professionals, academics, union members,
political activists, members of victimized minority groups, graduates of
08
elite and non-elite schools."'
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 479-80.

106. Id. at 480. Abraham Lincoln's evocative language of uniting heads and hands was
not unique to him. Throughout the nineteenth century, educators, moral reformers, and labor
activists commonly referred to creating, what historian Nick Salvatore refers to as, "the
harmony of the head and the hand" in order to elevate all citizens to the status of
independent moral agents. See NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST
229 (2d ed. 2007). For instance, as trade unionist and presidential candidate, Eugene V.
Debs continually invoked the same imagery to emphasize that workers were more than just
"'hands' for a corporate employer. Id. at 228 (quoting Eugene V. Debs). By combining
labor and learning, they had the potential to assert their own political voice. Id. Inspeech
after speech, Debs declared, "'A thousand heads have grown for every thousand pairs of
hands, a thousand hearts throb in testimony of the unity of heads and hands, and a thousand
souls, though crushed and mangled, burn in protest and are pledged to redeem a thousand
men."' Id. (quoting Eugene V. Debs).
107. Gordon, supra note 14, at 71.
108. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Putting aside the question of how close we are to achieving the
meritocratic goal, even in its idealized form it is still far removed from the
vision articulated by Lincoln or Dewey. For them, democratization did not
result from fluid social mobility, and education was not meant as an
instrument for gaining higher rank. Rather, the democratic hope was that
common education at school, and most critically at work, would provide
everyone with the chance to participate on an equal footing in economic and
political life-regardless of standing. As one Indiana school superintendent
noted in 1875, "'If we shall limit the education of the masses, and trust to
the extended education of the few for directive power and skill, we must
expect to be ruled by monopolies, demagogues and partisans." ' 10 9 In fact,
the wariness of distinguishing between an educated elite and a laboring
mass led many nineteenth-century Americans to seek a thorough
reformation of the legal profession-which some feared embodied an
aristocratic and priestly class. As the following section highlights, the goal
of such reform was not the elimination of a morally reflective practice of
lawyering, but an attempt to buttress the lawyer's ethical autonomy by
disconnecting the bar from elite interests and connecting it instead to the
wider community of free laborers.
B. The Jacksonian Critiqueof Lawyering
The Jacksonian period is often viewed by legal scholars as an era in
which rural farmers, artisans, and their advocates attempted to eliminate the
legal profession's political independence and social power entirely,
comprising what Roscoe Pound famously called "The Era of
Decadence." 1 10 Spurred by the combination of universal white male
suffrage and the relative equality of frontier life, the early nineteenth
I
century witnessed the steady dismantling of the bar as a separate entity." '
The colonial distinction between barristers and solicitors quickly collapsed.
Bar associations, which had once asserted control over admission in parts of
New England, either disappeared completely or were reduced to city
associations of little political weight. 112 Apprenticeships, at the time the
only meaningful requirement for entrance to the bar, were either limited or
abolished entirely. 113 Historian Richard Abel writes that,
In 1800, fourteen out of nineteen jurisdictions required all lawyers to
complete an apprenticeship, often extending five years (the period then
109. SALVATORE, supra note 106, at 10 (quoting an Indiana school superintendent).
110. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 223-49

(1953).
111. This brief historical overview of the strains on the legal profession in the early
RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS
RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY
OF EDUCATION AND STRATIFICATION 148-51 (1979); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH
nineteenth century draws from three key sources:

40-44 (1989);

OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 249-311 (1950).
112. See ABEL, supra note 111, at 40; POUND, supra note 110, at 223-24.
113. A few jurisdictions continued to have bar exams, but these were "usually oral and
administered in a very casual fashion." See COLLINS, supra note 111, at 149.
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required of most English solicitors); by 1840 only a third of the states did
so (eleven out of thirty), and twenty years later 114
the proportion had
dropped to less than a fourth (nine out of thirty-nine).
These efforts reached a high watermark with Indiana's 1851 constitution,
which declared that, "Every person of good moral character, being a voter,
shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice."' 115 For
the legal community, the tides of democracy had produced a startling state
of affairs. Professional institutions and lawyer control over admission had
been thoroughly repudiated. Even more remarkably, legal work itself was
recast as a right of citizenship rather than a unique product of technical
expertise.
Yet, it is important to appreciate that these efforts were not meant to
eliminate lawyering as a form of work, but instead constituted an attempt to
unify labor and learning. What Jacksonian politicians and their radical
Jeffersonian predecessors opposed was the idea that lawyers constituted a
separate educated caste, uniquely knowledgeable about collective life and
privileged to intervene in politics. The existence of such a social group
presupposed a division of labor between what Dewey would eventually call
"culture and utility," and thus a rejection of the democratic project of
universal moral independence. When the social critic and Jacksonian
pamphleteer Orestes Brownson argued for "the utter extinction of all
privilege," he saw his primary ambition as elevating each laborer to the
level of autonomous citizen and decision maker.1 6 In words that Dewey
would echo eighty years later, Brownson wrote, "There must not be a
learned class and an unlearned, a cultivated class and an uncultivated, a
refined class and a vulgar, a wealthy class and a poor .... There shall be no

division of society into workingmen and idlers, employers and
operatives." 117
Two Jeffersonian thinkers, William Manning and Matthew Lyon, vividly
conveyed the problems with the prevailing position of lawyers in early
American public life, as well as how radical democrats imagined that the
legal profession could be successfully reconstituted. Manning was a selfeducated farmer of moderate status who lived in Billerca, Massachusetts
until his death in 1814. In the late 1790s he wrote a pamphlet entitled The
Key of Liberty. 1 8 Although unpublished in his lifetime, Manning's text
114. See ABEL, supra note I 11, at 40 (citing Robert Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870, 5
PERSP. AM. HIST. 403, 412-13, 417 (1971)).
115. HURST, supra note 111, at 250 (quoting IND. CONST. art. VII, § 21 (repealed 1932)).
116. Orestes Brownson, Brownson's Defence: Defence of the Article on the Laboring
Classes, BOSTON Q. REv., at 1, 60 (Boston, Cambridge Press 1840).
117. ORESTES BROWNSON,

Our Future Policy, in

15 THE WORKS OF ORESTES A.

BROWNSON 124 (Harry F. Brownson ed., Detroit, Thomdike Nourse 1884).
118. William Manning, The Key of Liberty: Showing the Causes Why a Free Government
Has Always Failed and a Remedy Against It. Addressed to the Republicans, Farmers,
Mechanics, and Laborers in America by a Laborer [1799], in THE KEY OF LIBERTY: THE
LIFE AND DEMOCRATIC WRITINGS OF WILLIAM MANNING, "A LABORER," 1747-1814, at 117,
117 (Michael Merrill & Sean Wilentz eds., 1993). For more on the life of William Manning
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provides particular insight into popular understandings of how legal
practice connected to democratic goals. What makes the pamphlet so
unusual is the fact that most ordinary farmers, not to mention the true rural
poor, had limited educational means and rarely expressed their political
views in writing at all, let alone with such depth and clarity. Manning, like
Brownson, Lincoln, and Dewey in later years, also saw free labor as
essential to proper citizenship. In keeping with many classical republicans,
he argued that every society faced a basic divide between the majority of
individuals, whose hard labor was "the parent of all property," and a select
few-landed gentry, merchants, and priests-whose wealth allowed them
to live without laboring. 1 19 Manning believed that such a leisure class
embodied a constant threat to democratic freedom, just as did a permanent
class of wage laborers.
According to Manning, since these elites were skeptical of popular selfrule and committed to maintaining a stranglehold on political authority, the
self-interest of the privileged few necessarily led them to subvert public
institutions. For the small farmer or artisan, one's property in land or tools
was directly tied to an immediate experience as a laborer. By contrast, for
landed gentry and merchant elites, their wealth derived from income
20
generated by the hard work of others, particularly tenants and employees.'
In order to justify their position of privilege as members of a leisure class,
Manning believed that such elites belittled the value of labor and
championed idleness as a social good. For instance, the landed gentry made
arguments on behalf of hereditary aristocracy, claiming that only those
removed from economic necessity or the experience of hard work were
capable of thinking in terms of the common weal. For Manning, because
these elites lived off the labor of others, they possessed a fundamental
interest in defending inequality and social hierarchy-and particularly, in
protecting a divide between a leisure class and a permanent majority of
dependent hirelings. In his view, the American promise of free labor would
remain plausible only as long as ordinary citizens were able to claim
political power from such groups in order to protect their autonomy and
independence at work.
and his relationship to American politics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
see Michael Merrill and Sean Wilentz's comprehensive essay introducing his collected
writings. Michael Merrill & Sean Wilentz, William Manning and the Invention ofAmerican
Politics, in THE KEY OF LIBERTY, supra, at 3-86.
119. Manning, supra note 118, at 135. All quotations from The Key of Liberty refer to the
1799 version edited by Merrill and Wilentz, with grammatical and spelling corrections made
including to the title.
120. Manning describes the self-interest of the few in these terms:
As the interests of the Few-and their incomes-lie chiefly in money at interest,
rents, salaries, and fees that are fixed on the nominal value of money, they are
interested to have the money scarce and the prices of labor and produce as low as
possible.... [T]he fall of the price of labor and produce, and the scarcity of
money, always bring the Many into distress and compel them into a state of
dependence on the Few for favors and assistances in a thousand ways.
Id. at 137.
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As for lawyers, Manning maintained that-like wage earners and
tenants-attorneys also suffered from a condition of fundamental
dependence, which posed a particular threat to the functioning of
democratic institutions. He wrote, "The greatest danger [to liberty] is from
the judicial and executive departments of governments, especially from
lawyers."12 1 Since lawyers gained their livelihood from "fees and salaries,"
they were often the functionaries of landed elites and thus extensions of
their domineering authority. 122
Rather than exercising independent
judgment on behalf of the whole community, lawyers used their special role
in legal and political life to maintain hereditary privileges and social
hierarchies. They did this by creating ambiguities in legislation, and
employing these ambiguities to manage politics according to "the interests
of the Few."1 23 Manning believed that for Americans to exercise selfgovernment, ordinary citizens had to be able to discern and shape the laws.
This meant that "[n]o care, pains, or precautions ought to be spared to make
them as few, plain, comprehensive, and easy to be understood as
possible."' 24 Despite this need, the bar, due to its dependence on
mercantile clients, made sure that "no person can understand what is law
and what not but by applying to a lawyer."' 12 5 The ultimate result was a
steady erosion in the ability of citizens to direct the activities of public life.
Writing at virtually the same time, Matthew Lyon further articulated why
lawyers were so committed to defending elite interests. Lyon was an
outspoken Jeffersonian politician and journalist from Vermont who became
famous as the first person brought to trial by the Federalists under the
Sedition Act of 1798. To this day, he is the only individual ever elected to
Congress from jail. 126 Throughout most of the 1790s, Lyon published a
newspaper called the Farmer'sLibrary and wrote extensively about the role
of lawyers in postrevolutionary America. His most stinging attack was
entitled Twelve Reasons, Against a Free People's Employing Practitioners
in the Law, as Legislators. Lyon believed that the bar's technical training
actually undermined morally reflective legal practice because it cultivated
the cultural ties between lawyers and the privileged few and fostered
distaste for the capacities and commitments of most citizens.
Like
Manning, Lyon viewed lawyers as unfree dependents of wealthy elites; they
therefore stood up "for the claims of landlords, landjockies and overgrown
27
land jobbers, in preference to the poorer sort of people."'
Yet, Lyon went further and argued that the reason why lawyers identified
their interests with the privileged few was not simply because of material
121. Id.
122. Id.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. at 140-41.
Id.
For more on Matthew Lyon's remarkable life and career, see ALEINE AUSTIN,
MATTHEW LYON: "NEW MAN" OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION, 1749-1822 (1981).
127. Matthew Lyon, Twelve Reasons, Against a Free People's Employing Practitioners
in the Law, as Legislators,FARMERS' LIBR., Aug. 19, 1794.
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dependence. The very nature of legal training rejected the ideal of universal
education, which held that all individuals should be equally skilled in
practices of deliberation and self-rule. By contrast, lawyers were taught to
believe that they embodied a learned caste specially endowed with social
knowledge and that popular citizens were rife with ignorance and
destructive passions. Moreover, while legal work should be seen as one
form of labor among many, professional education led lawyers to
consider themselves excluded from the solemn denunciation of our
Maker; which says to man, that "in the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat
bread," an exclusion by which they [lose] the benefit of a qualification
that legislators have; who by experience, and their own personal labors,
and the habits, as well as of the
have become acquainted with the feelings
128
mode of thinking of their constituents.
Legal education trained lawyers in a Mandarin language whose purpose was
to "mak[e] the laws obscure" and render ordinary political participation
impossible. 129 It taught lawyers that politics was a site for elite wisdom and
that most citizens were fundamentally incapable of wielding collective
authority. It therefore bred in the bar a respect for hierarchy and deference,
which threatened the basic principles of self-rule.
In Lyon's view, this tendency derived in part from the profession's use of
British common law as the foundations of its practice, which encouraged
lawyers to see the oppressive and antiquated rulings of old English judges,
rather than social need or everyday experience as the appropriate basis for
the rule of law: "They are early taught to revere the opinions of, and look
up to, ancient British Judges, for authorities and presidents, who have
derived their greatness and sucked their principles from the very poisonous
breast of monarchy itself."' 30 While members of the bar believed that this
education promoted virtue and the capacities of statesmanship, Lyon argued
just the opposite. By teaching deference to a hierarchical past, it
undermined the ability of lawyers to reflect autonomously on the public
good and to see how discretion in legal work was tied to the larger
Combined with the
democratic goal of universalizing free labor.
profession's financial dependence on the privileged few, extended
education in the common law reinforced the bar's tendency to reduce
justice to the goals of wealthy clients. Even when claiming to act in the
interests of all, legal training stripped lawyers of the skills for independent
reflection and undermined their ethical commitment to democracy.
This view of lawyers as dependent laborers, not unlike wage earners or
tenants, lasted long into the nineteenth century. Nearly one hundred years
after Matthew Lyon wrote his pamphlet on the bar, labor activists like
George McNeil declared that lawyers had become little more than

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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"administrators of estates, and not of justice."' 13 1 In other words, while
legal practice inherently enjoyed opportunities for independent moral
action, lawyers as a whole-due to education and practice-were incapable
of thinking autonomously and acting on the basis of the common good.
The profession's dependence on the privileged few meant that most of what
attorneys did amounted to settling financial disputes between elites and
supervising the inheritance of wealth. As "administrators of estates" they
may have been more highly paid than wage employees, but they were still
essentially dependent laborers.
Thus, when Jacksonians during the "Era of Decadence" attempted to do
away with specialized legal education and colonial era bar associations,
they sought to disconnect the profession from a vision of itself as a priestly
class. Rather than being salaried dependents of the wealthy, they hoped
that lawyers would situate their practice within communities of ordinary
citizens and see their activity as a form of free labor that mirrored the
autonomy of small property holders. Instead of basing their practical
judgments in common-law training, lawyers would see themselves as no
different from other laborers who grounded their ethical commitments and
knowledge in collective needs made evident by everyday experience. For
our purposes, the critical point is that Jacksonians and others did not
consider democratic values to be incompatible with the lawyer's exercise of
independent ethical standards. In fact, they believed just the opposite:
sustaining a democratic culture meant ensuring that lawyers continuously
reflected on the community's basic interests. Moreover, such a legal
orientation would only emerge if two conditions were met. First, lawyers
had to become small proprietors who did not rely on elite benefactors and
thus were financially independent of any social constituency. And second,
attorneys had to appreciate that the defense of their own ethical autonomy
was intrinsically tied to protecting the free labor and economic
independence of all citizens.
C. The Cultivated Thought of the DemocraticLawyer
At first glance, President Abraham Lincoln appears to be an archetype of
the lawyer as wise political guardian, playing a "transcendent" role in
collective life. Yet, in many ways, this presentation of Lincoln as
republican statesman misreads his broader political theory, which
fundamentally repudiated the stratified account of citizenship espoused
(implicitly or explicitly) by Jefferson, Madison, Brandeis, and others. It
thus misconstrues his rationale for why the legal profession must be
oriented toward the public good. In particular, Lincoln's vision of legal
independence reinforced the long-standing goal of universal moral
independence, which was present in earlier thinkers such as Manning and
Lyon and in Jacksonian critics of professional privilege. By reflecting on
131. See THE LABOR MOVEMENT: THE PROBLEM OF TO-DAY 456 (George E. McNeil ed.,

New York, M. W. Hazen 1891) (1887).
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this tradition as a whole, one can begin to assess the continuing relevance of
past notions of democratic ideals and the lawyer's ethical duties for today's
drastically changed circumstances.
In the legal ethics debate, Lincoln is often presented as a classic example
of how lawyers should be moral activists reflecting on the worthiness of
their clients' ends. In his Springfield practice, he once famously told a
prospective client,
Yes, we can doubtless gain your case for you; we can set a whole
neighborhood at loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and her
six fatherless children and thereby get you six hundred dollars to which
you seem to have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs, it appears to
me, as much to the woman and her children as it does to you. You must
remember that some things legally right are not morally right. We shall
not take your case, but will give you a little advice for which we will
charge you nothing. You seem to be a sprightly, energetic man; we would
advise132you to try your hand at making six hundred dollars in some other
way.
For Kronman, the exercise of such judgment made Lincoln an exemplar of
the ideal of statesmanship and illustrates the continuing capacities of the
well-trained lawyer to serve as political guardians for our collective
institutions. In his view, Lincoln, the lawyer-statesman, acted on the basis
of his learned reflection and wisdom, "his prudent sense of where the
balance between principle and expediency must be struck." 133 Similarly,
for Luban, Lincoln suggests the possibilities for a people's lawyer to
embody an exemplary "phronimos," or Aristotelian moral expert, capable
of appreciating the likely consequences of social action and thus directing
clients and citizens toward the common weal rather than their private
interests.1 34 In essence, both base Lincoln's commitment to infusing work
life with independent judgment in the lawyer's distinct status as a learned
professional who, unlike the ordinary individual, develops the qualities of
deliberation and is thus suited for political and moral decision making. In
the process, these arguments tie Lincoln's ethically reflective practice to
older republican notions of stratified citizenship and transform Lincoln the
lawyer into an embodiment of elite participation and virtue.
Yet, for Lincoln, the lawyer's exercise of ethical judgment was not the
result of professional education and thus the possession of any natural
aristocracy or distinct class of virtuous elites. Rather, the lawyer, who
enjoyed a small practice that served the needs of the local community, was
at heart no different than a farmer or a craftsman. He imagined that all free
citizens, regardless of standing, should be "trained to thought[] in the

132. LUBAN, supra note 14, at 174 (quoting 2 WILLIAM H. HERNDON & JESSE W. WEIK,
HERNDON'S LINCOLN: THE TRUE STORY OF A GREAT LIFE 345 n.* (1889)).
133. KRONMAN, supra note 18, at 3 (citing BICKEL, supra note 10, at 65-69; HARRY V.
JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED 363-86 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 1982)).
134. LUBAN, supra note 14, at 170-74.
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country school[] or higher school,"' 135 and that such training would instill in
everyone an appreciation for the values of "book-learning," which gave
"access to whatever has already been discovered by others .... [and] a
136
relish, and facility, for successfully pursuing the [yet] unsolved ones."
When combined with the everyday experience of participating as equals in
public life and of shaping the ends of their work life, such universal
education would foster the skills of moral reflection and practical wisdom.
According to Lincoln, and like John Dewey at the beginning of the
twentieth century, this combination of learning and labor had the potential
to create democratic citizens of remarkable intelligence and foresight. In
such a political community, legal craft would come to embody one more
form of "thorough work"-labor that Lincoln believed united "cultivated
thought" with the practices of ethical care, self-discipline, and
comprehensiveness. 137 Thus, when a lawyer made judgments about the
worthiness of clients' goals, he acted as a free laborer in a society of equals
whose considered judgment grounded work life in the values of autonomy
and critical self-reflection.
Lincoln's vision of the democratic lawyer took as given a variety of
background conditions. He imagined a world without extremes of wealth
and poverty, in which virtually every citizen was a small property owner
who situated his work life in local communities.
Under these
circumstances, cultivated thought and thorough work would be accessible
to all. Lincoln declared,
The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for wages awhile,
saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land, for himself; then labors
on his own account another while, and at length hires another new
beginner to help him. This, say its advocates, is free labor-the just and
generous, and prosperous system, which opens the way for all-gives
hope to all, and energy, and progress, and improvement of condition to
all. 138

By reconceiving the relationship between work and citizenship, Lincoln
hoped that the old aristocratic divide between the few and the many could
be overcome once and for all. As a consequence, lawyers would no longer
be the dependent subjects of elite benefactors or a priestly class claiming a
monopoly on political knowledge. Instead, they would constitute one
category of free laborers among many, who employed discretionary
judgment and ethical care to sustain collective institutions.
One might argue that Lincoln's defense of the lawyer's moral
independence-of a piece with Jacksonian hopes for a reconstructed ideal
of legal practice-was tied to a set of social conditions that no longer mark
contemporary life and whose disappearance renders this defense obsolete as
well. Indeed, bureaucratization and the rise of an industrial economy,
135.
136.
137.
138.

LINCOLN, supra note 100, at 480.
Id. at 480-81.
Id. at481.
Id. at 478-79 (emphasis added).
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which went hand in hand with the decline of independent proprietorship,
present a clear challenge to imagining the modem bar as anything other
than a distinct political class or a source of technical expertise.
Nonetheless, the essential elements of this earlier democratic lawyer remain
as relevant today as ever. For one, they emphasize the centrality of
embedding the legal profession within a community of citizens equipped
with the material resources and cultural knowledge to intervene
meaningfully in legal and political processes. To the extent that most
citizens understood how the law operated and had the economic
independence to defend their interests and rights, professional discretion
would no longer be a special privilege but would instead become simply
one form of citizen autonomy.
The remainder of this essay attempts to translate this professional vision
into the present context. I detail how institutional and intellectual shifts in
the last century have radically altered the nature of American economic and
political life and have stripped most citizens of a daily experience in
collective self-rule. I then turn to the role that lawyers qua lawyers may
play in facilitating discretionary popular power and in expanding
institutional sites for the broad exercise of moral independence. This
discussion focuses heavily on the relationship between attorneys and social
movements, both during periods of citizen assertiveness and during times of
organizational and collective retreat. Such lawyers, acting on behalf of a
democratic ethos, do so not simply as individual moral agents but as legal
professionals committed to a specific account of the rule of law and its
substantive aims. This vision of the lawyer's responsibilities is part and
parcel of an alternative legal tradition, one that Manning, Lyon, and Lincoln
struggled to situate as the basis of the rule of law.
1II. LEGAL DISCRETION UNDER MODERN BUREAUCRACY
Reflecting on the arguments of Lyon, Lincoln, and Dewey from our
current vantage point, the idea of the legal profession as one among many
economic and political sites for the exercise of citizenship and moral
agency can appear quaint. Lincoln's nineteenth-century hope for an
America composed of decentralized and producerist democracies has long
In today's environment of
since receded into the collective past.
administrative complexity and bureaucratic governance, even the dominant
accounts in legal ethics of independence and client control seem to
overestimate the rationality and social knowledge possessed by both elites
and ordinary citizens. The rapid growth of specialization within the bar
raises doubts about the capacity of contemporary attorneys to develop the
generalized experience and cultural sensitivity that supposedly grounded the
lawyer-statesman's practical wisdom. As for client-centered approaches,
the rise of the administrative state and the insulation of most individuals
from sites of political power challenge the extent to which clients-and
citizens at large-are actually capable of recognizing their own interests, let
alone coherently acting on them in legal and political arenas. At present, if
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the plausibility of even these truncated theories of democratic life is under
assault, one is left to wonder what remains of more substantive
commitments to self-rule.
Over the next three sections, I elucidate both the difficulties and the
possibilities for this democratic vision in the current moment. I begin by
exploring the bar's prevailing concerns about its own democratic
illegitimacy and the extent to which these concerns are tied to
transformations in the relationship between legal and political life. In
particular, this discussion emphasizes the increased disconnect between the
ideal of universal moral independence and the contemporary experience of
diminished access to actual sites of political and economic decision making.
In the second section, I highlight how these changes have fostered a
profound pessimism among public intellectuals and legal scholars,
exemplified by Walter Lippmann's classic texts on public opinion,
regarding the future of robust participation under administrative hierarchy.
Legal ethics has not been immune to this pessimism, as some scholars
wonder whether all that lawyers can do is serve as functionaries of the
bureaucratic state and ensure that legal order is maintained-almost
irrespective of the ends pursued by that state.
By contrast, I argue that at present, the goal of the democratic lawyer
should be precisely the opposite of defending the "authority of the law."
Instead, attorneys should employ their discretionary judgment to strengthen
the capacity of social groups to intervene in administrative decision making
and to create more participatory modes of economic and political
governance. Depending on whether strong social movements exist to
channel popular sentiment, the lawyer's approach to her discretion and to a
community of citizens may well be distinct. During periods of extensive
mobilizing and collective self-assertiveness, the profession should focus on
protecting the ability of groups to respond spontaneously to the decisions of
elites and to create institutional frameworks for entrenching popular voice.
To articulate how this might operate, I end by drawing from James Gray
Pope's excellent historical work on how labor lawyers in the 1920s and
1930s developed approaches for defending the union's right to strike' 3 9one such embodiment of popular political action. I use the example as a
thought experiment, which attempts to illustrate both the practical
distinctions between democratic lawyering and alternative ethical
approaches and the political stakes in how lawyers select between
competing accounts of representation.

139. See generally James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J.

941 (1997) [hereinafter Pope, Labor's Constitution]; James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause:
Labor and the Shaping of American
ConstitutionalLaw, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Pope, Thirteenth
Amendment]. My description of the competing rationales for the right to strike is taken from
a reading of these two articles, and thus is highly indebted to James Gray Pope's research.
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A. The Attorney's Role at the Intersection of Law and Politics
As Part II explored, there is nothing inherent in the attorney's legal
discretion that makes it incompatible with popular self-government. In fact,
for the competing legal tradition developed by Jacksonians, the lawyer's
potential to exercise independent moral judgment provided a framework for
how learning and labor could be combined in a society of autonomous
citizens. Today, however, the lawyer's discretion carries with it a far
different set of implications. With the collapse of the social conditions that
might have sustained a community of small producers, legal discretion has
come to symbolize the separation of most citizens from practical decision
making. Moreover, it underscores profound uncertainty among public
intellectuals and legal academics about the possibility of reviving
participatory citizenship in the face of bureaucratic complexity. This shift
is in large part due to twin developments in the relationship between law
and politics. By delineating these developments, we can assess both the
extent to which the profession actually faces a democratic deficit and the
reasons for the increasing pessimism among scholars about the potential for
a more substantive vision of democratic life.
The first of these twin developments is that political practices and
decision making in the United States are increasingly legalized. 140 As
critics of legal privilege like Gerald Rosenberg rightly point out, our most
contentious social problems, from affirmative action and gay rights to
emergency powers, have become matters of judicial adjudication in which
lawyers play a central role. This has made law into a primary discourse for
articulating grievances and for expressing our political disagreements. On
the other hand, just as politics has become more legalized, the law itself
seems subject to heightened political influence and control. Nothing
embodies this emergence more than the rise of "transformative judicial
appointments," the self-conscious use by Presidents of court nominations to
construct an ideologically supportive federal judiciary.1 4 1 Legal actors
themselves appear more and more like politicians, bound to networks of
patronage and common policy. In the words of Bruce Ackerman, postNew Deal judges on both the left and the right are not traditionalists; they
are in fact "prepared to support and elaborate a transformative vision of
14 2
constitutional law."
On initial inspection, neither of these developments are particularly
novel. American institutions and collective practices have long been
marked by a remarkable interpenetration of law and politics. Heightened
legalization and the focus on law as a basic mode for decision making date
back to the very beginning of the republic. Political scientist Stephen
Skowronek describes the early American state as one dominated by courts

140. For a recent discussion in political science and law, see MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC
STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION

(2002).

141. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 25-27 (1998).

142. Id. at 26.
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and parties. As he comments, "It fell to the courts at each level of
government to nurture, protect, interpret, and invoke the state's prerogatives
over economy and society as expressed in law."' 4 3 The result, as
Tocqueville so famously wrote, was precisely the legalization of politics:
"There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not
sooner or later turn into a judicial one. Consequently the language of
everyday party-political controversy has to be borrowed from legal
phraseology and conceptions."' 144 For this very reason, American legal
practice historically has been an inherently political enterprise. Without the
existence of a European-style civil service, legal activity in the United
States often became indistinguishable from the political work of policy
formation and statecraft. Gordon remarks that "[c]orporate lawyers did a
lot of the design of the legal forms of state-business relations that in Europe
was done by central bureaucracies."' 14 5 Moreover, the legal profession
provided the United States with a substantial portion of its political class.
In fact,
[t]he work entrusted to senior career ministers in Europe devolved upon
lawyers in the United States. Since the founding of the republic, about
two-thirds of the U.S. Senate and half the House of Representatives have
been lawyers, and lawyers
are the largest occupational group in most state
46
legislatures as well. 1
It was for all these reasons that Jacksonians like Brownson were so wary of
the legal profession and the capacity of the bar to institute itself as a learned
class usurping collective authority and acting in the interests of a privileged
few.
Still, if the interpenetration of law and politics as such is hardly a new
phenomenon, the contemporary moment is distinct for at least one crucial
reason: state and economic institutions have become far more intricate and
disconnected from actual communities.
If the average citizen in the
nineteenth century wished to see firsthand the workings of government, he
simply had to visit two institutional spaces: the local legislature and the
courthouse. The legislature provided easy access to the disagreements and
competing goals of the community's various social groups and political
parties. As for a trip to the courthouse, it allowed one to witness the inner
workings of the state's primary functions. This was because, along with
addressing ordinary civil and criminal cases, the courts "had become the
American surrogate for a more fully developed administrative
apparatus."' 147 Importantly, both spaces were utterly public and readily

143. See

STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF

NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 27 (1982).
144. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 40, at 270.
145. Gordon, supra note 56, at 306.
146. Id. (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 647 (1985);
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available to citizens in a local community. Such publicity meant that not
only could ordinary individuals keep continual tabs on the activities of their
representatives, but they could also organize popular power spontaneously
to intervene in decisions that were inimical to basic social needs-through
actions ranging from petitions and protests to mobbings and court
closings. 148 All of these conditions checked the capacity of elites, including
powerful lawyers and judges, to substitute their own will for a collective
one. Even members of a gentry bar, who saw themselves as republican
statesmen wary of the multitude, were still largely rooted in particular
communities and bound to other citizens-if for no other reason than by the
capacity of local publics to assert a direct and immediate political voice.
By contrast, the current interconnection of law and politics takes place
against a backdrop in which the publicity and accessibility of key
institutions are deeply limited. 14 9 At present, administrative elites appear to
have greater control over political and economic processes than ever before,
with citizens largely removed from the arenas of decision making.
Moreover, the political actors who operate at the center of these institutions
are increasingly less rooted in local communities or the concerns of most
individuals. As public mediators between Americans and their judicial and
political systems, lawyers in many ways typify such trends. In particular,
the stratification of the bar between elite attorneys who work on behalf of
powerful clients in practice settings such as securities, corporate tax, and
antitrust, and a lower tier who struggle to make a living and who provide
legal services for debt, divorce, and immigration highlights the popular
separation from actual political power.1 50 Those lawyers with the greatest
wealth and opportunity to participate in decision making are often precisely
those most removed from everyday interaction with average Americans.
One could argue that in today's profession the prestige and quality of
representation is inversely correlated with actual human suffering or with
148. For more on popular political action in the early republic, see generally LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (1993); WOOD, supra note 31.
149. Moreover, the federal government's transparency policies-which aim to provide
citizens with usable information about state and corporate behavior-often serve the
opposite function, by making decision-making processes even more opaque. A recent book
by Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil assesses eighteen federal disclosure
systems, covering issues as diverse as corporate finance, workplace safety, school
performance, and terrorist threat levels. See generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL
DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007). They find that policies
meant to enhance public awareness instead produced information that was "incomplete,
inaccurate, obsolete, confusing, or distorted." Id. at 7.
For example, in conveying
information about the safety of drinking water, "Congress crafted a [disclosure] requirement
that employed technical terms, produced inaccurate and out-of-date information, failed to
link contaminant data to health risks," and left citizens with the "daunting task of
interpreting complex documents." Id. at 7-8.
150. See HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS, supra note 55, at 84 (providing a table

illustrating the breakdown in prestige between various legal specializations, with services to
ordinary citizens systematically falling at the low end of the scale).
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the lawyer's location in a community of citizens. Thus, it is not surprising
that when the bar's elite seeks to defend the profession's independent
judgment it turns to republican discourses of statesmanship and
differentiated participation. Due to prevailing hierarchies within the bar, let
alone in society at large, the power and privilege of the most prestigious
lawyers appear to have little in common with ordinary forms of citizenship
or work life.
These circumstances clearly place pressure on the potential of legal work
to provide an example for universal moral independence.
Crucially,
however, they put the dominant frameworks in legal ethics under severe
strain as well. Republican defenses of legal independence-calling either
for statesmanship or a people's lawyer-themselves rely on a vision of
legal practice threatened by the rise of modern bureaucracy.
When
Brandeis defended the wisdom of lawyers, he was specifically referring to a
generalized legal practice, in which the attorney's clients were not only
corporate entities, but individuals of various backgrounds widely dispersed
throughout society. In his words,
If the lawyer's practice is a general one, his field of observation extends,
in course of time, into almost every sphere of business and of life. The
facts so gathered ripen his judgment. His memory is trained to
retentiveness. His15mind
becomes practi[c]ed in discrimination as well as
1
in generalization.
By contrast, one is left to wonder whether a profession marked by
specialization, in which the most prestigious attorneys hardly ever interact
with individual clients, is similarly capable of prudent judgment and
republican virtue-and therefore worthy of political leadership. At the
same time, client-centered approaches from the Left and the Right argue
that lawyers should hew closely to client wishes because they take for
granted that ordinary citizens understand their own interests and recognize
how best to achieve them. Yet, the very isolation of most individuals from
political and legal institutions, as well as the increasing complexity of the
administrative state, also leaves open the extent to which these assumptions
are sustainable.
This suspicion of the capacities of both lawyers and ordinary citizens
means that, for some public intellectuals and legal scholars, collective life
must aim much lower than a substantive democratic vision of participatory
politics and continuous popular involvement. As the next section discusses,
in the legal ethics debate over professional independence, these views are
implicit in a growing tendency to view lawyers as ultimately little more
than civil servants of an administrative state. W. Bradley Wendel and
Daniel Markovits both see democratic politics under modern bureaucracies
as subject to irreconcilable normative disagreements, which make social
order fragile and a site for permanent instability. In this context, all that
lawyers can do is employ their discretionary judgment to contain collective
151. Brandeis, supra note 66, at 332.
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disagreement. Rather than pursue their own autonomous moral ends or
uncritically maximize client autonomy, the lawyer as bureaucratic servant
remains faithful to the law of the administrative state, regardless of whether
social institutions embody ideal ethical practices. In many ways, these
views underscore the sense that meaningful citizenship-in either elite
republican or radical democratic varieties-are at root incompatible with
the prevailing specialization and institutional hierarchy. Thus, confronting
such approaches is essential to clarifying what remains feasible about any
account of legal citizenship, whether elite republican or democratic.
B. Lippman, Amateur Executives, and the Obedient Lawyer
In order to appreciate fully the current pessimism regarding robust
citizenship and popular self-rule, it is essential to begin with our country's
most unabashed and sophisticated twentieth-century critic of democracy,
journalist Walter Lippmann. Writing in the 1920s during the same period
as Dewey, Lippmann too saw America as fundamentally distinct from the
decentralized economic and political community it had been. With the rise
of an industrial economy, the growth of bureaucratic institutions, the
increasing centralization of corporate power, and the emergence of
professional groups such as doctors, social workers, teachers, and lawyers,
society appeared more impenetrable than ever before. While Dewey sought
to conform the new landscape to long-standing respect for free labor and
robust citizenship, Lippmann argued that the time was appropriate to put to
rest-once and for all-popular faith in the value and sustainability of selfgovernment. Over the last century, his arguments have become the
theoretical touchstone for a vision of politics that de-emphasizes an ethics
of citizenship and ties the practice of lawyering to specialized service in the
activist state.
In many ways, Lippmann's efforts connected him to an elite republican
discourse that dated back to the founding, which stressed the limits of
ordinary citizenship and presumed the need for a separate political class,
often comprised of lawyers. However, Lippmann was also skeptical of the
potential for professionals to embody a natural aristocracy capable of
thinking broadly in terms of the general good. In his view, specialization
and hierarchy meant that most individuals, including administrative elites,
had limited social experiences and were knowledgeable only about their
immediate economic tasks. As a result, groups such as lawyers should
conceive of their role as serving a particular function within a complex
social apparatus rather than as statesmen or wise rulers. Instead of asserting
its own independent and competing accounts of the public interest, the
primary purpose of the bar was to uphold legal and political institutions and
assist bureaucratic executives in distributing economic abundance.
These arguments were a far cry from those offered by Brownson,
Lincoln, or Progressives like Walter Weyl. Weyl, who coedited the New
Republic in the first decades of the twentieth century, contended that the
problems of social complexity had to be addressed by elevating the citizen
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and creating within individuals the ability to direct new institutions and
economic practices. Through the instrument of public education, Weyl, not
unlike Dewey, hoped that all citizens could learn how to express their
political will to elected representatives as well as how to bind new markets
to actual consumer needs. 152 More than protecting self-rule, he hoped that
"[t]he higher education of the multitude... would create a revolutionary
force in the community of astounding power and magnitude." 153 It would
allow ordinary men and women to reclaim control "in their industrial
pursuits, in their political
activities, and in their private life outside of
54
industry and politics." 1
By contrast, Lippmann argued that any educational system committed to
instructing the public at large in how to exercise practical authority was
bound to fail. Given the specialization of modern societies, the everyday
citizen would always be an amateur when it came to politics, necessarily
more concerned and knowledgeable about her own work and private life.
Lippmann argued that, "[n]o scheme of education.., can endow [the
citizen] during a crisis with the antecedent detailed and technical knowledge
which is required for executive action." 1 55 Thus, the purpose of a wellordered system of training was to prepare each individual for their allotted
task within society's division of labor. If individuals could not be broadminded citizens oriented toward a general public interest, they could be
made experts of a corner of the bureaucratic framework and thus able to
perpetuate the smooth functioning of collective life. According to him,
American education had always been falsely tied to outmoded assumptions
about oinicompetent citizenship, either elite republican or radical
democratic, in which individuals were presumed to be capable of
comprehending the entirety of social experience and thus acting on the basis
of truth rather than mere opinion or conjecture. Lippmann argued that
nineteenth-century attitudes had "aimed not at making good citizens but at
making a mass of amateur executives."1 56 In his view, since administrative
hierarchy was a social necessity, which any educative scheme had to
appreciate, only those at the very top of the bureaucratic structure-his
institutional executives-were required to access more comprehensive
knowledge. But crucially, even they relied on specialized experts rather
than their own gathered wisdom for this knowledge, and so operated within
the framework of society's extensive division of labor.
For Lippmann, when individuals, whose work life and general
circumstances were narrow and highly distinct, pursued larger accounts of
the common weal or invested politics with totalizing ideologies, the result
was that they threatened social order and left public life "flounder[ing] in a
152. See generally WALTER E. WEYL, THE NEW DEMOCRACY:
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TENDENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1913).

153. Id. at 329.
154. Id. at 330.
155.
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156. Id. at 148.
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chaos of local opinions."1 57 This danger was all the more relevant for
professionals and specialized experts such as lawyers. These groups
possessed valuable knowledge in the functioning of particular institutions or
bureaucratic practices and thus could help integrate society's competing
elements and factions. Yet, when they acted on the basis of contested moral
ends, or sought to champion the interests of particular groups, they simply
aided the forces of chaos and instability. In order to avoid these problems,
Lippmann believed that Americans should in the end refuse to "hang[]
human dignity on the one assumption about self-government."' 158 Instead,
he contended that government's primary purpose was to distribute
economic abundance, a task that experts, including lawyers, could perform
through the operation of their own scientific knowledge and technical skill.
Such a social order was the best that industrial societies could hope for and
constituted a new variation of democratic life. While this distributive
community would no longer be grounded on meaningful self-rule, it
nonetheless combined stability with a broad enjoyment of material and
social goods. Lippmann insisted that,
The criteria which you . . . apply to government are whether it is
producing a certain minimum of health, of decent housing, of material
necessities, of education, of freedom, of pleasures, of beauty, not simply
whether at the sacrifice of all these things, it vibrates to the self-centered
opinions that happen to be floating around in men's minds. In the degree
to which these criteria can be made exact and objective, political decision,
which is inevitably the concern of comparatively
few people, is actually
59
brought into relation with the interests of men.]
In this account of an activist state, Lippmann saw even the practice of
voting, what Jefferson once viewed as the primary domain of ordinary
citizenship, as playing only a marginal practical role. For Lippmann, voting
embodied the last widely accessible vestige of the nineteenth century's
commitment to popular participation. Nonetheless, he argued that voting
was ultimately not about expressing popular interests regarding the
direction of collective life. As suggested by his views of education,
Lippmann believed that most people were ill equipped under industrial
society to develop any political projects or to display collective agency.
Therefore, "calling a vote the expression of our mind," as Weyl maintained,
was little more than "an empty fiction."' 160 Instead, voting embodied a
receptive act of selecting an already fully formed product. He wrote, "The
public does not select the candidate, write the platform, outline the policy
any more than it builds the automobile or acts the play. It aligns itself for or
against somebody who has offered himself, has made a promise, has
produced a play, is selling an automobile."' 6 1 Citizens chose leaders from
157.

WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION

158. Id.at 313.
159. Id. at 313-14.
160. LIPPMANN, supra note 155, at 56.
161. Id. at 57.

293 (Macmillan 1960) (1922).
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lists of preapproved candidates and then departed the political stage, leaving
actual policy questions to executives and those administrative experts
scattered throughout economic and political institutions.
In the current debates in legal ethics about the status of professional
independence, one can see Lippmann's own skepticism about democratic
possibility and meaningful citizenship seeping into accounts of lawyering.
In particular, two recent and thought-provoking assessments of the function
of the bar in modem life are deeply animated by Lippmann's distrust of
popular participation. In his article Civil Obedience, W. Bradley Wendel
attempts to step outside the dominant debate between defenders of
professional independence and their client-centered opponents, by offering
a competing argument about how lawyers should exercise their inherent
discretion. 162 Like Lippmann, Wendel argues that society is marked by
unavoidable ethical pluralism, or what he calls a "diversity of reasonable
moral beliefs." 63 This pluralism makes the coordination of social activity a
source of profound difficulty, and active popular participation a continual
pressure on the sustainability of collective institutions. Wendel argues that
law's primary purpose is to provide a framework for integration, one that
contains the public's "persistent moral disagreement." 164
In this context, lawyers are neither independent moral agents nor solely
the zealous advocates of their clients' interests. Instead, they are "quasipolitical actors" armed with significant public responsibilities; in particular,
lawyers are meant to remain faithful to the law and to ensure that legal
institutions resolve disputes in keeping with established rules.16 5 Given the
fragility of political settlement, Wendel argues that the profession's
governing principle should be respect for the "authority of law"' 166 and its
primary role to protect "social stability" from the ever-present danger of
politics "slipping into either anarchy or a police state." 167 As Wendel
argues,
Under the authority conception of legal ethics, lawyers are duty-bound not
to frustrate the achievement of law by reintroducing contested moral
values into the domain of law, either in the guise of principles of
interpretation or as the basis for68an ethically motivated decision to act or
not to act on behalf of a client. 1
Like Lippmann, not to mention elite republicans, Wendel imagines popular
self-government as a "chaos of local opinions." The moral force behind his
call for "civil obedience" is the fear that the public, when actively involved
in politics, is as likely to promote disorder as it is to pursue any
recognizable common good. Yet, unlike Jefferson's and Tocqueville's faith
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Wendel, supra note 16.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 364-65.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 366.
Id.
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in natural aristocracy, Wendel also shows little hope that the legal
profession has the prudence to navigate contested moral questions and to
act on the basis of wisdom. For him, the lawyer's skill is merely enforcing
the government's interest in upholding the law, and thus the attorney is at
root a bureaucratic functionary-a scribe not of the client but of the
administrative state. As such, Wendel carves out a particular path for how
lawyers, in keeping with Lippmann's vision of specialized expertise, may
relate to their own capacity for discretion. On the one hand, he concludes
that lawyers should not pursue client interests that, although technically
legal, undermine the larger authority of the law. Nor, however, can they
resist lawful aims for purely moral reasons. In doing the latter, the lawyer
would "simply reinscrib[e] in the attorney-client relationship the very moral
disagreement the law was intended to preempt."' 169 Instead, the attorney is
under the permanent obligation, regardless of the administrative state's
70
actual ethical validity, "to preserve the common framework of law."'
17 1
In Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View,
Daniel Markovits
reaches surprisingly similar conclusions. Like Lippmann, Markovits also
maintains that the discrete social function played by lawyers makes them
unlikely to display republican virtue. In his view, the modern lawyer is an
expert in the skill of argumentation and bound most closely to the
established procedures and rules embedded in government bureaucracies.
According to Markovits, the attorney's "capacity to argue all sides and his
allegiance to procedures rather than outcomes, makes him unsuited to moral
leadership" as well as "render[s] him incapable of leading" political life.1 72
Yet, in keeping with both Lippmann and Wendel, these very qualities also
provide the attorney with unique skills within the administrative state for
integrating diverse social elements and protecting public order. For
Markovits, this legal function as a bureaucratic servant is critical precisely
because of the dangers posed by democratic politics. Without mechanisms
to regulate competing groups, "all forms of social order"' 173 would find
themselves threatened by "the 'perpetual conflicts between rival impulses
and ideals."' 174 Given this fact, attempts by attorneys to act on the basis of
their own moral autonomy would place the entire edifice of collective life in
peril. As Markovits concludes of the ideologically motivated or "realist"
lawyer, "The realist lawyer cannot help the law preside over the conflict
because she self-consciously declares herself to be outside of the law and a
part of the conflict, and this is why modern society has never allowed all, or
even most, of its lawyers to act like realists." 175

169. Id. at 382.

170. Id. at 366.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Markovits, supra note 21.
Id. at 276.
Id.at 289.
Id.at 288 (quoting STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 189 (1989)).
Id.at 289 (footnote omitted).
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In the end, the vision of social life espoused by Lippmann, Wendel, and
Markovits goes too far in repudiating both legal citizenship and popular
participation, even acknowledging the pressures of heightened bureaucracy.
They seem to suggest that contemporary politics is frequently and
unacceptably on the precipice of disorder, and thus efforts by citizens to
intervene in public life are as much a source of danger as they are one of
This implies not only a rejection of Lincoln's
potential renewal.
commitment to universal moral independence, but also pessimism about the
very possibility for politics to be a site for collective improvement. In
essence, such arguments, by invoking the specter of social collapse,
undermine attempts to see political and legal frameworks as fundamentally
malleable-the product of our own agency and thus open to reform or even
transformation.
Moreover, given their emphasis on respect for established rules, it is not
surprising that Wendel and Markovits tend to read popular political activity
as a form of unruliness. Precisely due to the rise of modem bureaucracies
and social complexity, collective action in twentieth-century social
movements has inevitably moved "out-of-doors."' 176 As Wolin notes, for
most individuals, "[b]ecause of the exhausting demands of making a
'living,' surviving under harsh circumstances, dedication to a political life
is hardly a conceivable vocation." 177 By and large, most citizens have
neither the energy nor the desire to develop the forms of specialized
knowledge necessary to intervene cogently within the frameworks offered
by administrative institutions. According to Wolin, what reinforces this
tendency is the fact that popular interventions are rarely triggered "by a
yearning for political participation," but instead emerge from "felt
178
grievances" regarding one's everyday circumstances and experiences.
As a consequence, political activity under modem bureaucracies is often
"informal, improvised, and spontaneous"I 79-taking the shape of mass
protests, extralegal assemblies, boycotts, petitions, and strikes. From the
perspective of the administrative state and Wendel's obedient lawyer, these
actions may well appear as threats to social integration. Still, they also
represent a genuine display of democratic sentiment about social ends and
the course of collective life. To the extent that modem hierarchies
undermine local self-government as a general method of economic and
political decision making, modes of mass dissent offer a critical avenue for
sustaining democratic vitality. In embodying what Franz Neumann once
described as "spontaneous responsiveness to the decisions"'180 of elected
representatives and bureaucratic elites, such public pressure in both the
176. For a general discussion of the rise of informal protests and public actions by social
groups in the face of administrative hierarchy, see FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1977).
177. WOLIN, supra note 32, at 255.

178. Id.
179. Id. at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. FRANZ NEUMANN, The Concept of Political Freedom, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND
AUTHORITARIAN STATE 160, 192 (Herbert Marcuse ed., 1957).
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workplace and politics presents a central mode for social groups to
intervene directly in institutional decisions.
One concrete means by which the modern lawyer can fulfill the
democratic hope of making legal autonomy a basis for widespread moral
agency is to protect the public's capacity for "fugitive" or "spontaneous"
acts of political assertiveness during periods when social groups are
politically active and engaged. In many ways, this is precisely the opposite
of envisioning attorneys as actors that employ legal process to-dampen
points of conflict and disagreement. As Neumann wrote, democracy under
conditions of mass bureaucracy "requires that social bodies such as political
parties and trade unions remain free of the state, open, and subject to rank
and file pressure; and that the electorate, if faced with serious problems, be
capable of spontaneously organizing itself for their solution. '' 18 1 Since
attorneys find themselves at the intersection of law and politics, they can
employ their discretionary judgment to enhance and protect the conditions
by which popular groups express their own democratic energy. In doing so,
lawyers do not use their moral and political independence to act as prudent
leaders in the long-run best interest of other social groups, as both
Tocqueville and Brandeis imagined. Rather, in defending sites for popular
discretion and dissent, modern lawyers can see ethical autonomy in work
and politics as a broad social good, as opposed to the purview of
professional elites alone.
C. The Strike, PopularCitizenship, and the DemocraticLawyer
Perhaps the strike is the most classic informal means by which citizens,
organized as employees, challenge the prerogatives of corporate and
administrative employers. Such challenges are of utmost importance in
contemporary democratic life, particularly given the general loss of control
experienced by wage earners since the entrenchment of modern
corporations. In essence, the strike embodies a remaining form of
discretionary popular power that allows citizens to assert their own
authority over the economic domain.
No doubt, legal questions
surrounding the right to strike present only one potential embodiment of
how lawyering connects to popular power and assertiveness. Still, the topic
provides a clear issue area in which to delineate the practical differences
between competing legal ethics frameworks-such as people's lawyering,
client-centered views, and Wendel's model of "civil obedience"-in the
context of mobilized and self-assertive constituencies. As a launching
point, I revisit James Gray Pope's research on how Progressive attorneys
addressed the constitutional arguments of their unionist clients in the years
prior to and during the New Deal-a peak of labor organizing and activity.
This discussion is not an effort at historical reconstruction; rather, it
employs the basic contours of the events Pope describes as a fact pattern for
thinking through how lawyers might have behaved differently under similar
181. Id.
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circumstances. As a thought experiment, the example illuminates the extent
to which distinct schools of legal ethics, including the democratic ethos I
espouse, recommend alternative approaches for an attorney's interaction
with her clients and with social movements. Each account of legal ethics
implies divergent understandings not only of how lawyers relate to their
political communities, but also of the strike's social meaning and legal
status.
Pope's work presents a basic dilemma in the purpose of legal advocacy,
one that labor attorneys were continually confronted by in the early decades
of the twentieth century. Unions perceived the right to strike as a crucial
element in their ability to resist employers equipped with far greater wealth,
resources, and relative bargaining position. Furthermore, unions saw the
strike as essential to sustaining the wage earner's economic and ethical
independence under vastly changed conditions. If laborers could no longer
directly dictate how their labor was to be employed, at least they could use
spontaneous and collective power to reassert some degree of economic
control. For labor leaders ranging from Samuel Gompers to Andrew
Furuseth and John Lewis, the strike was believed to be a fundamental right,
given constitutional life by the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription of
"involuntary servitude." 182 According to unionists, the Supreme Court's
decision in Bailey v. Alabama,183 invalidating the state's debt peonage law,
stood for the claim that the Thirteenth Amendment sought "'to make labor
free by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is
disposed of or coerced for another's benefit." ' 184 They argued that the
individual worker by himself was helpless against the combined power of
corporate institutions. The strike, as a form of popular political action, not
only protected individual employees against the coercive strength of their
employers, but also established the moral conditions for free labor. As
Pope writes, it provided workers with "'effective freedom,"' or "the ability
not only to influence the conditions of working life, but to do so
consciously, in combination with one's coworkers, using forms of action
that yield immediate, unambiguous evidence of personal and collective
185
potency."
Yet, Pope tells us that overwhelmingly the lawyers who represented
union clients and were supportive of labor legislation rejected such political
and legal reasoning as the basis for defending the right to strike. Like Felix
Frankfurter-who was eventually appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt to
the Supreme Court-these Progressive and New Deal attorneys were
steeped in Brandeis's vision of a people's lawyer and committed to
constraining the power of corporate interests in the defense of general
public good. But, rather than presenting the strike as a fundamental right
182.
183.
184.
241).
185.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
219 U.S. 219 (1911).
Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 139, at 17 (quoting Bailey, 219 U.S. at
Pope, Labor's Constitution, supra note 139, at 942.
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embedded in the Thirteenth Amendment-in either the court or the public
sphere-union attorneys decided to emphasize Congress's commerce power
as a basis for pursuing labor legislation. Instead of a matter of basic
constitutional freedom, Frankfurter and others framed the strike as part of
the broad category of "economics," which under the Commerce Clause
depended for its legality "'upon a judgment about practical matters"' made
by Congress. 186 As Frankfurter asserted, "'[T]hat which is reasonably
defensible on economic or social grounds, whether or not it accords with
our individual notion of economics . . . cannot be offensive on
constitutional grounds." ' 18 7 By the end of the New Deal, arguments
grounded in the Commerce Clause gained the status of unquestioned law
and came to undergird the legitimacy of various labor provisions, not least
of which was the right to strike. In the process, they also ensured that the
strike would never achieve the level of a fundamental right, but rather
would rest upon "the ordinary political process subject only to deferential
' 188
review by the courts."
This example raises the basic issue of whether the attorneys should have
developed an approach to legal representation that affirmed the
constitutional vision asserted by their unionist clients. From today's
perspective, the answer seems fairly straightforward. The entrenchment of
the New Deal's legal account of the activist state makes reasoning from the
Commerce Clause appear as the self-evidently correct strategy. At present,
it would be the only legally viable approach; for a contemporary attorney to
argue otherwise might well evince a basic lack of professional competence.
Given the current state of the law, a focus on other legal rationales could
actually contravene guiding ethical commitments to providing clients with
adequate representation. 189 However, the power of Pope's historical
exegesis is to demonstrate that in the years preceding the New Deal, both an
argument from the Commerce Clause and from the Thirteenth Amendment
were highly controversial. If anything, Thirteenth Amendment reasoning
had more popular purchase and embodied a key means by which both
unions and their allies in Congress spoke of the right to strike. 190 Each
constitutional approach would have been deeply inconsistent with existing
Supreme Court doctrine, which emphasized economic due process, limited
the power of Congress to intervene on behalf of labor, and viewed such
efforts as unconstitutional "class legislation" that violated Fourteenth
186. Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 139, at 27 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Taft
and the Supreme Court, reprinted in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 49, 62-63

(Philip Kurland ed., 1970)).
187. Id. at 30 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, Address at the
Harvard Law Review Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Dinner (1912), in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON
THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 186, at 1, 5).
188. Id.
189. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007) ("A lawyer shall provide

competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.").
190. See Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 139, at 30-46.
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Amendment principles of equality. 1 9 1 Under these conditions of judicial
hostility, one could imagine thoughtful practitioners taking seriously the
unionist vision of constitutionalism and constructing a legally savvy
analytical framework to enable arguments from the Thirteenth
Amendment-whether they be directed at judges or fellow citizens. As one
element of such a framework, lawyers could show how fundamental rights
need not be absolute; as with freedoms of speech and assembly, the reality
of heightened scrutiny may well be compatible with legislative
infringement. The fact that union attorneys chose not to pursue this path
ultimately had far less to do with self-evident success or failure in court,
especially given that Commerce Clause arguments only eventually
succeeded as a result of profound political changes during the Great
Depression.1 92 In essence, the ideological commitments of the profession at
the time shaped in advance what such lawyers deemed politically
93
appropriate and possible. 1
Given that prevailing doctrine questioned the legitimacy of both
accounts, what does the representational approach actually pursued by
attorneys indicate about how they related to union clients and perceived the
meaning of their own discretion? In light of Pope's historical work, the
debate over the status of the strike provides a thought experiment for
imagining the practical implications of different approaches to legal ethics.
To begin with, unionist attorneys-self-conscious embodiments of the
people's lawyer-approached this dilemma in a manner that might be
familiar from this essay's discussions of Luban and Simon. Rather than
shying away from the realities of ethical discretion, they sought to expand
the space for the lawyer's own moral agency and political independence. In
thinking about this discretion, it is important to appreciate that whether the
unionist constitutional vision amounted to legal strategy or client goal was
itself deeply contested. Today's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
assert that while a "lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation," he or she has wide latitude in developing the
means for achieving these objectives. 194 Yet, here, it remained unclear
precisely how to distinguish between client objectives and lawyer means.
Were the unions interested in solely vindicating the right to strike no matter
191. Id. at 18-25.
192. For a discussion of the how political conditions transformed constitutional order
such that previously unacceptable modes of legal reasoning became the basis in the 1930s
for the legitimacy of the New Deal's activist state, see Bruce Ackerman's discussion of
"constitutional moments." ACKERMAN, supra note 141.
193. It also underscores the extent to which many lawyers viewed the U.S. Constitution
as ultimately a legal document, which should be treated as a site for expert elaboration.
Thus, unionist theorizing struck some lawyers as both unsophisticated and an unwelcome
intrusion into their proper sphere of authority. Pope quotes one union lawyer as dismissing
Andrew Furuseth's constitutional vision by commenting that, "'if you have an automobile
and it needs fixing you take it to an automobile mechanic.., and if you have a legal ill you
necessarily go to a lawyer."' Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 139, at 26 (citation
omitted).
194. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007).
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the rationale, or in championing an account of fundamental rights protected
by the constitution? For American Federation of Labor (AFL) leader
Andrew Furuseth, it was acceptable in crafting federal legislation to make
compromises concerning everyday politics. However, he saw the right to
strike as a fundamental value, for which there could be no legislative
compromise. As Pope quotes him, Furuseth believed that the strike should
be seen as comparable to hallowed freedoms such as speech. On these
matters, legal strategy and client objective merged because "there [could
be] no half loaf on fundamental principles ....

Whether a man or woman

shall belong to himself or herself or not is fundamental, as is the question
shall have a right to combine with others
whether or not that man or woman
195
for the purpose of mutual aid."'
However, exercising his professional autonomy, Frankfurter and others
read client ends narrowly, as committed solely to legalizing the right to
strike regardless of its constitutional status. While unions may have had
suggestions about legal strategy, it was the province of technical experts to
reach broad judgments about how best to pursue this far more limited
objective. Perhaps more importantly, the lawyers' strategy was invested
with deep political meaning. Like Brandeis, Progressive and New Deal
attorneys viewed themselves as acting in the best-considered interest of the
public writ large and thus as a crucial check against all competing factions.
As one such lawyer commented, the bar "'alone of all the orders of men
represents not force but justice, not caprice but law."' 196 To argue for a
fundamental right to strike based on the Thirteenth Amendment would have
been considered antithetical to the lawyer's unique responsibility as social
guardian to constrain mass publics when popular action veered from the
presumed common weal. It was to place laboring groups above the good of
the people as a whole. 197 For this brand of people's lawyering, attorneys
embody a natural aristocracy whose education and technical skill
supposedly imply practical wisdom and prudent judgment. Thus, when a
lawyer behaves as an independent moral agent, her agency devolves into a
form of republican elitism, in which she sees herself as acting on behalf of
client interests-but more broadly and "temperately" construed.
Both Wendel's account of "civil obedience" and client-centered
lawyering are similarly prey to problematic conclusions. Committed to the
"authority of law," Wendel's lawyer placed in this union representational
context would defend the right to strike, but ideally by employing strategies
that preserved the finality of legal settlement. In other words, he would-in
195. Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 139, at 30 (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
196. Pope, Labor's Constitutionof Freedom, supra note 139, at 1014 (quoting The Era of
Law, 23 LAWNOTES 1, 1 (1919)).
197. Pope tells us that, "While unionists argued that the Constitution precluded equivalent

treatment of capital and labor, progressive reformers contended that legislators should have
discretion to formulate legislative classifications-favorable or unfavorable-concerning
both capital and labor." Pope, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 139, at 30 (footnote

omitted).
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this case, not unlike the people's lawyer--deemphasize the discretionary
popular authority of social groups to challenge the framework of procedural
legitimacy. A fundamental right to strike, grounded in the Thirteenth
Amendment, would expand the discretionary power not of government but
of labor; it would thus potentially destabilize the finality of law and reopen
divisive moral disagreements. By contrast, client-centered accounts would
likely present a competing approach. According to this vision of legal
ethics, Progressive lawyers should have acted to reduce to a minimum their
independent discretion and therefore followed both the political ideals and
practical strategy presented by unions. Treating clients nonhierarchically
would entail rejecting lawyer presumptions of superiority, regardless of the
reality of technical specialization, and attempting to operate as an
instrument actualizing the client's already fully formed will. At the
extreme, the lawyer might pursue client-articulated strategies even if they
would be significantly less effective than those suggested by expertise.
Equally importantly, the lawyer would effectuate client ends broadly
understood, even if they compromise a more substantive vision of
citizenship and democratic life.
What might a democratic ethos indicate as a way to organize the
attorney's representational approach? As with the people's lawyer, this
viewpoint refuses to negate the bar's autonomy or to confine citizenship
solely to an electoral domain distinct from everyday employment. As such,
it sees professional discretion as more than an extension of technical
expertise. But unlike with legal statesmanship or people's lawyering, moral
agency is not defended out of a belief that lawyers possess (or should
possess) prudence. Rather, independence is defended to the extent that it
promotes a particular substantive principle and is exercised in a manner that
is consistent with democratic ambitions. Thus, a defense of the lawyer's
own ethical agency and reflectiveness is essential to meaningful
citizenship--to protecting and expanding the sites that remain for citizens
to enjoy autonomy over decisions that shape their lives in work and politics.
In keeping with the arguments of Manning, Lyon, and Lincoln, the lawyer's
individual discretion is taken as an exemplar of the forms of independence
that should be invested throughout social institutions.
To the extent that dictates of competence allow, or that the democratic
ideal is relevant to the particular representational context, this ideal should
infuse and organize a lawyer's advocacy inside and outside the courtroom.
Given the fact that the lawyer exists at the intersection of law and politics,
representation almost inevitably involves a wide range of practices. As part
of negotiation, client counseling, and trial advocacy, lawyers find
themselves (self-consciously or not) developing a legal discourse that often
structures what arguments and modes of reasoning become politically
available.
This means that lawyers must be attentive to the public
consequences of both their larger advocacy approach and their particular
legal strategies, and have the flexibility to use their discretion accordingly.
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In some cases this might involve reading client ends narrowly while in
others it might mean just the opposite.
To return to Pope's strike illustration, a democratic defense of
professional autonomy would mean taking a more expansive approach to
client ends. Under conditions in which organized social movements
confront entrenched and centralized bureaucracies, strengthening
democratic life is crucially tied to whether these groups can act informally
and extraprocedurally to contest the decisions of elites and to propose their
own solutions to collective problems. The strike embodies a definitive
expression of such discretionary popular power, and its protection is a
crucial avenue for a mobilized mass constituency to act independently of
the directives of economic and administrative authorities. In other words,
the reason for defending the Thirteenth Amendment approach would not be
to avoid "client domination" or to create a "nonhierarchical" practice
encounter. Due to the specialization that marks contemporary institutions,
there is no avoiding the reality that lawyers have superior technical skills in
legal domains. The challenge is how to make those skills serve critical
social ends, in particular efforts to extend the capacity of citizens to dissent
from those features of social life they find oppressive. The reason why
Progressive lawyers should have pursued the Thirteenth Amendment
argument as their primary focus is because it would have shaped the manner
in which their own clients and the public in general-not simply judicial
actors within the courtroom-conceived of the meaning of their collective
practices. During a period of energized popular participation, imagining the
strike as a fundamental right, rather than as a prerogative of congressional
power, would have shifted the framework for political discussion and
activity. Such democratic lawyering would have highlighted and sharpened
the essential disagreements between competing social elements and
reinforced the capacities of popular groups to dissent from established
practices.
On first glance, it might appear counterintuitive that the lawyer, who
Wendel primarily tasks with upholding the authority of the law, 198 should
instead be committed to expanding discretionary popular power and thus
the ability of citizens to impose their goals-even if it means acting outside
government's procedural framework. Yet, on closer inspection, this vision
of the democratic lawyer is not incompatible with respect for legality. As
has been argued previously, such lawyering is itself steeped in a longstanding legal tradition, one that articulated the ties between participatory
citizenship and the domains of law and politics. This tradition provided
generations of political and legal actors with an account of the lawyer's
place in a community of citizens. While the rise of corporate institutions
and the administrative state may have undermined the social conditions for
robust citizenship, this alternative legal framework still underscores the
198. W. Bradley Wendel's account itself draws from the Model Rules, which presents as

one of the central professional roles the notion that the lawyer is "an officer of the legal
system." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2007).
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duty of lawyers in their professional role to take seriously the aspiration to
broad moral autonomy.
Moreover, at present, the ability of social groups to act spontaneously to
assert their own interests and grievances has declined sharply. In this
context, in which the central social movements of the twentieth century
have largely collapsed as means for organizing and expressing popular
dissent, democratic lawyering cannot simply rely on protecting sites for
spontaneous action or maintaining the separation between government and
society.
The profession must actively participate in generating new
organizational structures for the articulation and enactment of constituent
goals; it must also help to reform the administrative state itself to include
far greater opportunities for participatory intervention and governance. In
the final pages of this essay, I draw out the lawyer's ethical responsibilities
for creating the social conditions necessary for robust citizenship inside and
outside the framework of everyday legal representation. In doing so, I hope
to suggest how linking professional discretion to a vision of democratic
community allows the lawyer to exercise her autonomy in ways that move
well beyond the prevailing binary between statesman and scribe.
CONCLUSION: THE LEGAL ROLE TODAY IN REVIVING DEMOCRACY
The current debate in legal ethics over whether attorneys should be
independent moral actors or client-centered autonomy agents presents a
strangely upside-down account of democratic life. Those who defend
independence assume the role (often unwittingly) of apologists for the bar's
countermajoritarian status. Rather than tying legal deliberation to the
democratic goal of elevating all citizens, their argument for moral discretion
rests on a theory of elite republicanism and promotes assumptions about the
virtue of professional leadership. Today's most outspoken defenders of
democratic legitimacy in legal ethics appear to conclude just the reverse,
namely that ethical independence for the lawyer is incompatible with selfgovernment. If nothing else, this essay hopes to recast the debate by
situating the lawyer's ethical activism within a richer account of
participation and autonomy. Throughout the nineteenth century, a wide
spectrum of American thinkers and political actors sought to reject notions
of political elitism and natural aristocracy, and instead imagined a social
community that combined labor and learning to inculcate citizenship with
practical control. Jacksonians, and their radical Jeffersonian predecessors,
saw the legal profession as both a threat and a potential aid in pursuing this
democratic promise, and hoped that lawyers could be persuaded to employ
their own moral agency to enhance that of their fellow citizens. In the face
of massive transformations that undermined the historical frameworks for
everyday economic and political participation, twentieth-century public
intellectuals questioned whether this earlier vision remained feasible. In
this context, it is not surprising that some legal scholars today are
increasingly pessimistic about either the moral capacities of the bar or the
potential for citizens to construct and impose an actual political will.
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Still, in our era of mass demobilization, in which social movements have
in large measure receded as mechanisms for organizing dissent and
presenting ideological alternatives, the responsibilities placed on the bar are
more pressing than ever. Today's dominant discourses revolve around
either the security claims of the state or the market dictates of corporate
entities. Given the prevalence of these modes of authority, the profession
can employ its own social power to speak on behalf of a distinct set of
values and to interject these values into our shared practices. In particular,
it can employ its discretion to strengthen the social bases required for
participatory citizenship and thus to link lawyering to a democratic
community. Such professional efforts should take place both at the
macrolevel of pursuing policies that open up the legal and political system
to greater contestation and popular involvement, and at the microlevel of
reframing client relationships in times of demobilization.
To begin with, this means confronting the complexity and seeming
impenetrability of prevailing institutions and reclaiming the radical
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian hope of creating more transparent and
accessible legal processes. Following Manning, Lyon, and Brownson, such
a template highlights the importance of simplifying the legal system and,
perhaps counterintuitively, enhancing the capacity of individuals to defend
their interests without recourse to lawyers. Recall that in legal ethics
discussions, the fear of domination, emphasized in radical client-centered
accounts, rarely refers to the lawyer's interactions with corporate entities or
wealthy individuals. Simon points out that for powerful clients-although
lawyers clearly do much more than merely translate their interests-the
exercise of this discretion hardly indicates that attorneys are in a position of
superiority.
Precisely because powerful clients have an array of
independent material and cultural resources, legal discretion actually
extends rather than compromises their capacity to pursue selected ends; if
anything, it makes lawyers the dependents of wealthy benefactors. By
contrast, for poor or disenfranchised clients, both the lack of independent
resources and the fact that legal services are generally provided through
private markets dramatically alter the nature of client-attorney encounters.
For many Americans, inequalities in legal access often reduce the courts
to a space for harassment and vulnerability, instead of a means for asserting
one's rights. In her book Access to Justice, Deborah Rhode presents a
picture of a legal system in which
[m]illions of Americans lack any access to justice, let alone equal access.
According to most estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of
the poor, and two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income
individuals, remain unmet. Government legal aid and criminal defense
budgets are capped at ludicrous levels, which make effective assistance of
counsel a statistical impossibility for most low-income litigants. 19 9

199. DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004).
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Under these circumstances, Richard Zorza tells us that, "[i]n many courts,
well over 50 percent of litigants appear without lawyers. For example, in
California, a court study found that in child support cases, only 15.95
percent of the cases had counsel on both sides, and that in 63 percent of
cases neither parent was represented (let alone the children). '20 0 Moreover,
the bar's general solution to such systematic inequality-increasing the
number of attorneys for the poor through government funding and greater
pro bono hours-only underscores the depth of the problem. Over the last
thirty years, government subsidies for legal services have dropped
dramatically, as national spending on legal aid has dipped by one-third and
heightened restrictions have been placed on both the types of clients and the
causes that state-supported lawyers can pursue. 20' As Rhode writes,
federally funded programs often refuse to represent clients deemed
"unworthy," a category that has expanded over time to include "prisoners,
undocumented aliens, women seeking abortions, and school desegregation
plaintiffs. ' 20 2 Yet, Russell Pearce notes that even with far greater
government support, equalizing access simply by increasing the number of
lawyers is an inherently flawed strategy. To begin with, providing quality
service to all low-income individuals would require dramatically increasing
the number of lawyers, perhaps by as much as tenfold. 20 3 Moreover, to the
extent that market relations still dictate the primary provision of legal
services, "[p]arties with greater resources would be able to purchase a
'20 4
higher quality of legal services and better absorb the costs of litigation.
Of equal importance, simply increasing the number of lawyers would not
shift how the legal profession is currently embedded in communities. At
present, to the extent that poor or marginal litigants have attorneys at all,
these attorneys are often either high-priced corporate lawyers engaged in

200. Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of JudicialNeutrality and
Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When PartiesAppear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions,
Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423 n. 1 (2004).

201. See RHODE, supra note 199, at 3-4.
202. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
203. See Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Marketfor Justice: Why Access
to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help,

73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 975 (2004). Pearce quotes from Gary Bellow and Jeanne
Kettleson in arguing that
society could never provide the resources necessary to provide quality legal
services to low-income people. [Bellow and Kettleson] noted that "even if
demand for legal services remained constant . . . it would not be possible or
desirable to expand the bar to meet the need." They explained that "to equalize the
number of lawyers available to the very poor and the rest of the population" would
require "[a] tenfold increase in the existing public interest bar" and that "to begin
to provide the whole population with the same legal services that the affluent
presently enjoy. .. would require something on the order of a tenfold increase in
the size of the entire bar."
Id. (quoting Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Security
and Fairnessin Public Interest Practice,58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 380 (1978)).

204. Id. at 974.
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pro bono practice 205 or, more commonly, legal aid advocates with limited
time or money to devote to representation. Each circumstance emphasizes
the vulnerability of the client as well as the sense that the lawyers involved
do so out of noblesse oblige or a vision of public service-one that actually
reaffirms elite republican notions of excellence and professional leadership.
Rather than a fundamental good experienced by all, the protection of basic
rights often devolves into a philanthropic grant impermanently and
unequally distributed. This reality embodies Manning's central fear about
the bar's potential role in American life: namely, that the legal system
would become so complicated and riddled with material disparities that
most individuals would have neither the capacity nor the opportunity to
defend their rights and interests as equals in the public arena. Faced with
these conditions, citizens would be incapable of comprehending-let alone
controlling-their own institutions and thus become entirely dependent on
forms of elite leadership.
In reflecting on the present moment, radical Jeffersonian and Jacksonian
calls for greater simplicity present one practical means for strengthening the
social prerequisites necessary for a democratic community. Rhode, Zorza,
and Pearce all focus on methods of enhancing the ability of individuals to
make sense of the legal system and to articulate their rights in court, even
without the aid of lawyers. Such scholars argue for expanding the use of
small claims courts; they also defend "implement[ing] proposals to place
self-represented parties who cannot afford a lawyer on more equal footing
by providing them with basic information on the law and procedures, as
well as ...forms and.., assistance in drafting pleadings and other court
papers." 20 6 These changes would go hand in hand with moving the judge
205. One recent example is the law firm Wilmer Hale's representation of six Algerian
detainees held indefinitely without charge by the U.S. government in Guanthnamo Bay,
Cuba. See Farah Stockman, Detainee Fight Gets Bigger, Costlierfor Long-Battling Boston
Law Firm, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 2008, at Al.
Their representation ultimately
precipitated the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229
(2008), which found that the right of habeas corpus applied to persons held in GuantAnamo
and to those imprisoned there as "enemy combatants." According to the Boston Globe,
"Since 2004, lawyers with the firm [Wilmer Hale] have provided 35,448 billable hours of
legal help, worth an estimated $17 million, making this case the largest pro bono effort in the
90-year history of the firm." Stockman, supra.
206. Pearce, supra note 203, at 976. Deborah Rhode provides a powerful encapsulation
of this approach to legal reform in describing various means for creating "law without
lawyers":
Eliminating archaic jargon, extended delays, and fragmented court structures are
crucial steps in that direction. Other key strategies include extended hours and
adequate pro se services in community and courthouse settings. Some courts
permit handwritten petitions and electronic filings; others offer hotlines, on site
childcare, and form preparation assistance through websites and computer kiosks.
A growing number provide at least some personal assistance in multiple languages
for pro se litigants through centers in courthouses, community organizations, or
even traveling outreach units. A few jurisdictions have substantially raised the
dollar limits of small claims courts, offered assistance to their users, and banned
appearances by lawyers in all cases or in proceedings where the opponent is
unrepresented. Such reforms should be more widely adopted and courts should
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toward a more active role-especially in pro se litigation-by ensuring that
parties fully understand the nature of proceedings and settlements as well as
by remedying procedural errors that would keep courts from hearing crucial
evidence or legal arguments. 207 Again, at stake would be more than
confronting the inequities in legal access. Greater simplification would
expand the cultural resources at the disposal of most individuals and help to
reframe how clients confront both the legal system and the bar. By
spreading legal information and access widely, these changes would help
reconstruct the manner in which lawyers are situated within communities.
While clearly only a limited step, they seek to ensure that when the bar
exercises its legal discretion, this discretion takes place against a backdrop
in which citizens too possess knowledge about their governing institutions
as well as some measure of autonomy in court practices.
In fact, these attempts to simplify legal process and expand citizen
resources should be considered part of a broader reform effort to expand
popular participation throughout regulatory institutions, wherever such
participation can be made feasible and institutionally effective. Given the
centrality of lawyers within the administrative state, the legal profession has
the opportunity to promote regulatory mechanisms and policies consistent
with what political scientist Archon Fung has called "accountable
autonomy." 20 8 This approach combines devolution, in which citizens have
extensive authority over social decision making, with centralized
monitoring-mitigating pathologies both of administrative hierarchy and
local parochialism. 209 In describing recent participatory experiments, Fung
highlights how administrative actors and local groups have attempted to
solve problems of bureaucratic failure by drawing on constituent knowledge
and involvement in areas often viewed as too complex for ordinary
citizenship.
At the municipal level, these examples include the
development of neighborhood councils in Chicago to address challenges in
public education and policing, which by the late 1990s incorporated
develop policies, training, and monitoring structures to promote fair treatment of

unrepresented parties.
supra note 199, at 86.
207. For more on injecting adversarial processes with a "managerial judge," see Russell

RHODE,

Engler, And Justicefor All-Including the UnrepresentedPoor: Revisiting the Roles of the
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987, 1987-92 (1999); Pearce, supra

note 203, at 975-79; Zorza, supra note 200, at 440-48.
208. See ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY

5-8 (2004).
209. Id. Such institutional approaches are comparable to what Michael Dorf and Charles

Sabel have described as "democratic experimentalism." See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, A Constitutionof DemocraticExperimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998). They
argue for a vision of participatory politics in which
subnational units of government are broadly free to set goals and to choose the
means to attain them. Regulatory agencies set and ensure compliance with
national objectives by means of best-practice performance standards based on
information that regulated entities provide in return for the freedom to experiment
with solutions they prefer.
Id. at 267.
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thousands of local residents into the direct activity of allocating budgetary
resources and developing basic policy strategies. 2 10 In the context of
federal environmental regulation, often seen as far too intricate for popular
intervention, reforms to the Endangered Species Act have created
participatory processes by which stakeholders including developers,
community groups, and environmental activists work jointly to create
Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs). According to Fung, "[t]hese plans aim
to devise durable ecosystem-management strategies that simultaneously
protect endangered species and allow human development."' 2 11 Such
experiments in participatory governance, alongside a transformation in
court process, suggest the type of macro-reform initiatives that can reduce
administrative complexity and strengthen the social conditions for
widespread self-rule.
Ultimately, however, moving courts away from an exclusive orientation
toward lawyers and altering regulatory processes only speak to one side of
the current predicament. Attorneys themselves must confront the meaning
of their own legal practice at a historical moment when professional
autonomy is no longer a widely shared experience but rather an elite
privilege. With the decline of broad-based social movements, democratic
lawyering also requires far more than what it might have during the heyday
of labor activism. Rather than focusing simply on informal or spontaneous
modes of social pressure, it means no less than employing one's
professional power and experience to help construct the very associations
and institutional frameworks-inside and outside of the administrative
state-that can house popular participation. As articulated by Scott
Cummings and Ingrid Eagly, such an emphasis on "law and organizing"
entails that attorneys "focus their efforts on facilitating community
mobilization. '2 12 But unlike with some "law and organizing" approachesoften associated with radical client-centered views-lawyers should not
refrain from infusing their practice with a guiding normative vision out of
fear that it may lead to client domination. 2 13 By returning once more to the
classic debate between Bell and Luban over class action litigation, we can
highlight how such a substantive focus provides attorneys with methods

210. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright argue that such neighborhood councils have
"created the most formally directly democratic system of school governance in the United
States. Every year, more than 5,000 parents, neighborhood residents, and school teachers are
elected to run their schools. By a wide margin, the majority of elected Illinois public
officials who are minorities serve on these councils." Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright,
Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance, in DEEPENING

DEMOCRACY:

(Archon
Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003).
211. See FUNG, supra note 208, at 234.
212. Cummings & Eagly, supra note 80, at 447.
213. Cummings and Eagly note that when grassroots initiatives are too beholden to
postmodern fears of client domination, they avoid constructing any "comprehensive
alternative social vision, which ultimately prevents them from developing institutional
structures and challenging the hegemony of liberal capitalism." Id. at 486.
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 3, 8
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both for avoiding the statesman-scribe binary and for combining
professional obligations with broader democratic commitments.
At the heart of the Bell-Luban debate over whether NAACP lawyers
should have pursued their own accounts of the best interest of black parents
214
was the reality of what Rhode calls "class conflicts in class actions."
Parents represented by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund themselves
disagreed deeply over the proper framework for confronting the racial
discrimination embedded in the American education system. As previously
discussed, to some extent these disagreements were practical and concerned
simply whether integrationist strategies like busing would actually enhance
or reduce the overall quality of schools. Yet, Gary Peller powerfully
captures how black communities were also torn between two competing
ideological visions of racial equality. 2 15 On the one hand, groups like the
NAACP advocated an integrationist stance that "locate[d] racial oppression
in the social structure of prejudice and stereotype based on skin color, and
that identifie[d] progress with the transcendence of a racial consciousness
about the world. '2 16 Thus, NAACP attorneys informed local communities
that they would refuse desegregation cases unless integration was a central
objective. 2 17 On the other hand, Peller notes that many in black
communities opposed the idea that race consciousness should be overcome
at all. Articulating a commitment to black nationalism, these individuals
"asserted a positive and liberating role for race consciousness[] as a source
of community, culture, and solidarity to build upon rather than
transcend. '218 As Malcolm X famously argued, all-black schools need not
be viewed as the product of discrimination:
[I]f we can get an all-black school, that we can control, staff it ourselves
with the type of teachers that have our good at heart, with the type of
books that have in them many of the missing ingredients that have
produced this inferiority complex in our people, then we don't feel that an
It's only segregated
all-black school is necessarily a segregated school.
2 19
when it's controlled by someone from outside.

Neither Luban's nor Bell's ethical accounts of legal representation offer a
compelling method for attorneys to navigate these ideological
disagreements. Without offering a serious argument, Luban essentially
stipulates as a matter of fact that the integrationist ideology amounted to the
long-term best interest of the class as a whole and that the NAACP lawyers
214. Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34
(1982).

STAN.

L. REV. 1183, 1211

215. See generally Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758.

216. Id. at 759-60.
217. See Rhode, supra note 214, at 1216. Rhode notes that in one Pennsylvania school
case, "Legal Defense Fund attorneys indicated that they would not represent the plaintiff
class if its objective was simply to upgrade ghetto schools rather than to achieve
desegregation as well." Id. at 1213 n. 121.
218. Peller, supra note 215, at 761.
219. Id. at 763-64 (quoting Malcolm X, BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SPEECHES,
INTERVIEWS AND A LET-rER 16-17 (G. Breitman ed., 1970)).
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were fight to pursue their own moral worldview regardless of the actual
community of parents. In his view, the matter was self-evident: "a racially
integrated future is better than a racially segregated one."' 220 Not only does
such presumptuousness collapse into legal-statesmanship at its most highhanded, one could also argue that it fails to represent adequately the
litigation class that would be affected by desegregation suits. Given that the
NAACP was the only organization pursuing class actions, its effective
monopoly meant that black parents opposed to the integrationist approach
had no viable legal alternative and would have to live with court remedies
to which they fundamentally objected but were nonetheless instituted on
their behalf. As Bell notes, this embodied a situation in which lawyers
contravened the spirit of ethical rules stipulating that attorneys should keep
their personal interests from interfering with client representation. 2 2 1
Unfortunately, Bell's solution of following parental dictates is equally
problematic. By simply transforming the lawyer into a functionary for
those parents already mobilized, his client-centered approach would have
done little to guarantee that legal representation conformed to the wishes of
the class as a whole rather than an active minority within it.
By contrast with each of the preceding frameworks, democratic
lawyering sees the creation of processes for participatory citizenship as a
potential solution to class disagreement. According to this competing
ethical approach, attorneys should have pursued the formation of inclusive
parental associations, aimed at offering a mechanism for black communities
to consider distinct ideological visions of racial equality and to discuss the
likely educational outcomes. Particularly at a juncture in the civil rights
movement when mobilized constituencies were receding from the public
sphere, lawyers had the opportunity to develop organizational frameworks
to sustain popular involvement. Such frameworks, which harness citizen
voices, ensure not only that client goals are actually assessed but also that
any exercise of independent judgment by the lawyer is part and parcel of a
more general exercise in popular discretion. As a consequence, organizing
drives would have been far more broad-ranging than the plebiscites or
public hearings courts often employ to poll class views. 2 22 Historically,
open meetings in school desegregation cases yielded very poor turnout-a
fact that is unsurprising given the exhausting work and family demands

220. LUBAN, supra note 14, at 348.
221. Under the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
the bar's ethical model at the time,
[t]he professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of
the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences
and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the
desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1983) (citing ABA CANONS OF PROF'L

ETHICS Canon 35 (1908)).
222. On the limits of court-imposed "majoritarian" solutions to problems of intraclass
conflict in class action litigation see Rhode, supra note 214, at 1232-42.
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placed on many low- and middle-income Americans. 22 3 Crucially, these
public hearings were not part of larger collective projects, which tied
parental involvement to clear mechanisms for pursuing their interests.
While the difficulties of mobilizing poor constituencies have been well
documented, 2 24 organizers also have numerous tools at their disposal to
foster meaningful participation. 22 5 In deciding how to strengthen parental
voice, lawyers could have employed their own judgment to decide which
tools would best promote associational activity. In a context like school
desegregation-in which parents were deeply invested in the future of their
schools and previous civil rights associations were decaying-a judicious
combination of organizing practices had the possibility of renewing
participatory energy. At their best, such efforts may have provided the
seeds for more permanent institutions, affording local communities with a
setting for asserting control over key social and political decisions.
Crucially, this mode of legal organizing not only fulfills the democratic
commitment to disperse moral autonomy widely, it combines such
commitments with the lawyer's duty to provide competent legal
representation free of conflicting interests. To the extent that associations
were inclusive and created fair procedures for generating and voicing
collective demands, these parental groups could have articulated which
client ends to pursue-integrationist or black nationalist-in class action
lawsuits. There is no doubt that ideological disagreements would be deep
Nonetheless, making such
and potentially impossible to overcome.
disagreement explicit-rather than cloaking it by imposing a false
normative agreement-would still have played a critical function. In the
case of sustained opposition, it would have made apparent the internal
tensions within the community and highlighted the professional
inadequacies of majoritarian polling solutions or of simply bundling all
parents together. By the same token, the opportunity to engage with
ideological disagreement may well have produced the opposite effectemphasizing shared interests and affording parents a framework to reach
consensus over questions of profound social significance. In each case, the
lawyer's role in promoting participatory mechanisms would have tied duties
of representation to the goal of robust citizenship. Moreover, one should
note that this entire process would have been permeated by professional
223. Rhode tells us that, "[iun a Pittsburgh school desegregation case, 25 to 30 individuals
out of a class of 2,000 students and 4,000 parents typically attended open meetings." Id. at
1234 n.207.
224. Along with Rhode's discussion in Class Conflicts in Class Actions, supra note 214,
at 1234, see also political theorist Carole Pateman's seminal account of the reasons for low
levels of participation among marginal social groups. CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 45-66 (1970). On the specific case of the structural difficulties faced

by attempts to mobilize welfare recipients in the welfare rights context see PIVEN &
CLOWARD, supra note 176, at 296-354.
225. Cummings and Eagly discuss a variety of strategies for enhancing low-income
participation including educational efforts, signature gathering, demonstrations, media
pressure, popular involvement in drafting proposed legislation, and, eventually, institution
building. See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 80, at 480-84.
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discretion, evident in everything from initial efforts at organizing to
constructing strategies needed to implement stated ends.
By creating mechanisms for popular participation, such democratic
lawyering provides one example of how legal independence can embody a
general social template. Unlike the lawyer-statesman, the focus on
organizing does not presume that the lawyer's moral independence derives
from unique insight into how best to reconcile ideological disagreements or
to construct a general public good. And, in contrast to radical clientcentered accounts, the attorney need not shrink from her position of
technical expertise and independent judgment. Instead, the democratic
lawyer ties the profession's irreducible discretion to a guiding substantive
principle-the desire to instill all economic and political arenas with
opportunities for popular decision making. In doing so, the attorney, in his
or her own legal practice, combines duties of competent representation with
an overriding democratic ethos. By drawing from a long-standing legal
tradition, such lawyering suggests that a commitment to moral
independence-if grounded by a political theory that gives substance to the
meaning of this independence-need not be trapped within the rubric of
statesman or scribe.
In reorienting the ethical commitments of the profession, the lawyer's
own independence and discretionary judgment can be a potential basis for
social renewal. The problem with most accounts in legal ethics that attempt
to take democracy seriously is that they fail to address the consequences of
the public's separation from the sites of political authority. With powerful
economic actors as well as the state's coercive capacity seemingly
unrestrained by popular sentiment, the legal profession-if armed with
political and moral independence-has the opportunity to supply a critical
check on elite institutions. When legal scholars seek to limit the lawyer's
discretion as an ethical actor, they not only do a disservice to the ideal of
morally reflective work, they also further negate those tools still within
reach for challenging the hierarchy of contemporary practices. Just as for
past Americans, the ultimate ambition of legal independence must be to
protect the democratic promise at the core of collective life. At present, we
are clearly a long way from the hope of citizens equally engaged in and
reflective about their work lives and political conditions. As a result, the
project facing both lawyers and the public at large is ultimately one of
recovery.
This task entails reclaiming lost democratic ground and
safeguarding essential building blocks of autonomy and moral
independence-both inside and outside of legal practice. These building
blocks are imperiled not by the expression of popular power, but instead by
its notable absence.

